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THE SLOWDOWN in productivity growth in the U.S.  economy that has 
occurred in the past ten years has been  the subject of  several careful 
studies accounting for growth.' Although these studies differ in method- 
ology and emphasis, their overall conclusion is clear. They attribute most 
of the slowdown in the growth of average labor productivity to a decline 
in the growth rate of total factor productivity-that  is, to developments 
other than changes in the quantities of  capital and labor used in pro- 
duction. 
This finding could mean either that the rate of technological change is 
now much slower than it was, or that the effective flows of capital and 
labor services have grown more slowly than the measured quantities of 
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these inputs, or perhaps both. In this paper I examine the second of these 
explanations. I suggest that the slowdown in productivity growth has been 
associated with a decline in the growth of the effective flows of services of 
capital and labor. Of the two, the decline in the flow of capital services 
is probably much more  important; it  has  resulted from the increased 
obsolescence  of  the capital stock  and structural adjustment problems. 
This paper presents evidence on this central hypothesis explaining the 
productivity slowdown. However, many questions of measurement and 
interpretation remain,  and  many  others  are  raised  without  complete 
answers. Further research will  be  needed  to  test  the hypothesis  more 
fully. 
In the first part of the paper the background of the productivity slow- 
down is briefly reviewed. I then explore the extent to which changes in 
labor quality or work effort could have led to an overestimate of effective 
labor services in conventional measures of labor input. The central hy- 
pothesis about capital services is subsequently developed. An important 
empirical fact that suggests a decline in capital services is that the market 
value of corporate capital has fallen since the mid-1960s.  The analytical 
basis for associating the market value of capital with the flow of capital 
services is developed in some detail. Finally, the pieces are assembled to 
see if they add up to an explanation of the slowdown. 
The Extent of the Productivity Slowdown 
Table  1 shows the rates of growth of  average labor productivity for 
alternative aggregate sectors and of two estimates of total factor produc- 
tivity (actually two-factor productivity in both cases).2  In the top half of 
the table the growth rates are calculated from actual data, before  any 
cyclical adjustment. All these unadjusted series show productivity growth 
slowing, first in 1968-73  and then further in 1973-79.  The data also con- 
firm that the two estimates of total factor productivity show a slowdown 
at least as great as that obtained with the labor productivity measures. 
2.  Average labor productivity is the ratio of output to labor input computed as 
the total hours of all workers.  Total factor productivity  measures  the increased out- 
put that occurs after allowing for the contribution  of labor and capital to output. 
Here it is computed in a manner described  by Denison or Fraumeni and Jorgenson, 
"Capital Formation." Throughout this paper percentage changes in a variable are 
calculated as one hundred  times the change in the logarithm of the variable. 1-  .  0) 
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A  simple  regression  procedure  was  used  to  derive  cyclically  ad- 
justed productivity series from the unadjusted data. All  the aggregates 
show roughly constant trend growth rates through 1968, so the logarithm 
of the level of productivity (ln p)  was regressed on a constant, time (t), 
and a cyclical indicator (LU)  for the 1949-68  period. The regressions 
for all sectors were similar. For the nonfarm business sector, which is 
representative, it was the following  (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
(1)  lnp  =  1.43  +  0.0236t-0.0139LU 
(129.9)  (63.3)  (-5.96) 
+  0.00015 ILU(-1)  2  =  0. 996. 
(0.06) 
The cyclical variable, LU, is the Perry weighted unemployment rate ad- 
justed in two ways.3 First, an adjustment was made for the observed lag 
of  unemployment behind the early productivity decline  that occurs  as 
demand and output weaken.4 A "leading" unemployment rate was con- 
structed for year t as the average Perry rate for the last two quarters of t 
and the first two quarters of t +  1. Second, the trend in the unemploy- 
ment rate was removed.5 
For  all four productivity aggregates, the  regression fit very closely 
through 1968  (R2 was 0.99).  The trend growth rate of productivity from 
equation 1 is 2.36  percent a year. It is 2.95  percent for the total private 
sector, 2.88 percent for private business, and 2.64  percent for nonfinan- 
cial corporations. For each sector, the coefficient on LU was always sig- 
nificant and positive. The coefficient on LU( -1  ) was always insignificant 
and varied in sign. All equations imply that high unemployment relative 
to trend reduces the level of productivity. 
Cyclically adjusted rates of  labor productivity growth are shown in 
the bottom half of table 1. They were calculated by applying the coeffi- 
3.  George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets and Inflation," BPEA, 3:1970, 
pp. 411-41. 
4.  For a discussion of this point see Robert J. Gordon, "The 'End-of-Expansion' 
Phenomenon in Short-Run  Productivity Behavior,"  BPEA, 2:1979, pp. 447-61. 
5. This was done to avoid associating the upward drift in unemployment  during 
the 1970s with the slowdown in productivity.  The two phenomena may be related- 
for example, if changing demographics both slowed average productivity growth 
and increased the unemployment rate-but  that is a hypothesis to be tested sepa- 
rately. In practice, the trend in the Perry unemployment  rate is fairly small and its 
removal has a rather minor effect on the results. Martin Neil  Baily  5 
cients on the cyclical variables from the equations estimated through 1968 
to the entire 1948-79  period. In contrast to the unadjusted series, little 
slowdown is evident before 1973 in the labor productivity series. In the 
series for total factor productivity there is evidence of a slowdown starting 
after 1968.  All  measures of productivity show a sharp slowdown  after 
1973, even when cyclically adjusted. 
It is clear that the productivity shortfall is not, to any important extent, 
a result of  cyclical slack. The worsening productivity performance oc- 
curred despite a strong expansion from 1976 to 1979 that increased real 
output in the private business sector 4.5  percent a year. In particular, 
it is difficult to believe weak productivity resulted from "labor hoarding," 
the usual explanation of low productivity in a downturn, when total em- 
ployment in the private business sector was 13.0 percent higher in 1979 
than in 1976. 
THE  MAJOR  SECTORS 
A primarily aggregative view of the slowdown is taken in this paper. 
But to give a more complete review of the facts, table 2 presents the data 
on labor productivity disaggregated by major sectors of  the economy. 
For the division of nonfarm business into the manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing sectors, the 1980 revision of national income accounts are 
available corresponding to  the  aggregates in  table  1.  Evidently  labor 
productivity growth slowed noticeably outside manufacturing after 1968, 
but this was offset in the aggregate by an acceleration of  productivity 
growth within manufacturing. After  1973  productivity growth declined 
sharply in both sectors and was close to zero outside manufacturing. 
The data disaggregated further by industry have not yet been revised, 
so the unrevised series are shown for industries in table 2. A comparison 
of both series for manufacturing shows that the revision increased the 
recorded productivity growth rate for the 1968-73  period substantially 
but did not greatly change it in the other periods. 
Among the individual industries, productivity in the construction and 
mining industries is notable. After increasing in almost every year since 
1948, labor productivity in construction declined by more than 5 percent 
a year during 1968-73  and continued to fall after 1973,  although at a 
slower rate. If the data are to be believed, average labor productivity in 
construction by 1979 was at the same level that it was in the early 1950s. 6  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1 981 
Table 2.  Annual Growth Rates of Labor Productivity for the Nonfarm Business  Sector 
and for Major Industries, Not  Cyclically  Adjusted, Selected Periods, 1948-79 
Percent 
Subperiod  Eintire 
Sector and  period, 
industry  1948-57  1957-68  1968-73  1973-79  1948-79 
Nonfarm  businessa 
Manufacturing  2.64  2.82  3.52  1.51  2.63 
Nonmanufacturing  2.14  2.76  1.04  0.25  1.82 
Industriesb 
Manufacturing  2.57  2.84  2.72  1.41  2.47 
Agriculture  5.58  4.76  5.12  2.81  4.68 
Communications  4.62  5.71  4.57  6.06  5.28 
Construction  2.50  2.98  -5.15  -2.49  0.47 
Utilities  6.78  5.16  3.19  -0.66  4.18 
Finance,  insurance, 
and real estate  2.42  1.70  0.07  0.89  1.49 
Mining  4.11  4.29  0.20  -5.19  1.75 
Retail trade  2.36  2.63  1.70  0.78  2.04 
Wholesale  trade  2.65  3.71  3.15  -0.44  2.51 
Transportation  2.94  3.36  2.51  0.12  2.47 
Services  1.19  1.82  2.01  0.14  1.34 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Data reflect the 1980 revision of the national income accounts. 
b. The 1980 revision is not yet available by industry, so these data are not directly comparable to other 
data in this paper. 
If construction were excluded from the total private economy, the growth 
of labor productivity would increase by 0.47  percentage point for  the 
1968-73  period. For other periods the exclusion of construction makes 
only a small difference. 
The decline of labor productivity in mining in  1973-79  is almost as 
striking as it is for construction in the previous period. However, because 
mining is a much smaller industry than construction, its impact on the ag- 
gregate series is fairly small. The level of productivity also declined some- 
what in two other major industries in the last period. 
Although  the  productivity declines  in  construction  and mining are 
most striking, it is significant that productivity growth in all the industries 
except communications slowed after 1968  or after 1973.  This suggests 
that some major common cause is at work. Such a conclusion  is rein- 
forced by either a broader or a narrower perspective. Productivity growth 
has slowed in all the industrial countries. And the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in a study of three- and four-digit industries reports that three- Martin Neil  Baily  7 
Table 3.  Annual Growth Rates of the Net and Gross Capital-Labor Ratios,  Various 
Sectors, Selected Periods, 1948-79a 
Percent 
Subperiod  Entire 
period, 
Item  1948-57  1957-68  1968-73  1973-79  1948-79 
Private business 
Net  4.01  3.28  2.87  1.32  3.05 
Gross  3.24  2.70  2.83  1.80  2.70 
Nonfarm  business 
Net  3.20  2.91  2.69  1.09  2.60 
Gross  2.38  2.31  2.64  1.61  2.25 
Manufacturing 
Net  2.54  1.43  2.24  3.27  2.24 
Gross  2.76  1.29  2.49  3.20  2.28 
Nonfarm  nonmanufacturing 
Net  3.46  3.51  2.56  0.18  2.70 
Gross  2.30  2.38  1.92  0.93  2.00 
Nonfinancial  corporations 
Net  2.73  1.32  1.65  1.32  1.78 
Gross  2.01  0.87  1.59  1.68  1.47 
Sources: The total labor hours are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; the net and gross capital stock 
data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
a.  The capital-labor ratios are the ratios of the stock  of  equipment and  structurcs (net or gross) to 
total labor hours. 
fourths of  a sample of  seventy-five industries had  slower productivity 
growth after 1973 than before.6 
CAPITAL-LABOR  RATIOS 
Table 3 presents capital-labor ratios for major aggregates for several 
major sectors. The  capital stock measures used  are the net  and gross 
stocks of equipment and structures. The gross stock assumes that capital 
is a one-hoss-shay; it is appropriate if the flow of capital services remains 
unchanged over the life of the capital. The net stock subtracts deprecia- 
tion each year and is appropriate if the flow of capital services declines 
over the lifetime of the capital good in line with measured depreciation. 
6. John  W.  Kendrick, "International Comparisons of  Recent  Productivity 
Trends,"  paper presented at the Electric Power Research Institute Workshop, Palo 
Alto, January 12-14, 1981; and U.S. Department  of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics, Productivity  Indexes  for  Selected  Industries,  1979  Edition,  Bulletin  2054  (U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1979), p. 2. 8  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
I have more to  say about capital below.  But  two points  are worth 
noting  at the  outset. First,  there has been  a  slowdown  in  the  rate of 
growth of the measured capital-labor ratio in the private business econ- 
omy, and this has presumably contributed to the slowdown in labor pro- 
ductivity growth. Taken as a whole, however, these data for capital stock 
do not provide a sufficient explanation for the slowdown, particularly for 
manufacturing and nonfinancial corporations. Second, the sharp differ- 
ence in the pattern of capital accumulation between manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing  within nonfarm business helps to explain the difference 
in the productivity performance of these two sectors. 
Labor Quality and Effort 
I next consider three ways in which the flow of effective labor services 
may have declined relative to the measured flow of labor input so as to 
affect productivity growth. First, the influx of young people and women 
into the labor force may have lowered effective, relative to  measured, 
labor input. Changing educational  attainments may also have  affected 
labor quality. Second, the new young entrants to the labor force in some 
recent years may have been less productive than their counterparts in 
other years-some  "vintages" of workers are less efficient than average. 
Third, work effort may have fallen for everyone, or at least have fallen 
on average across the entire range of workers, young and old. Work prac- 
tices may now include more breaks, more days of sick leave, and more 
vacation days. These three possibilities are not mutually exclusive, but I 
examine them separately below to determine how plausible or how im- 
portant they are likely to be. 
DEMOGRAPHIC  CHANGES 
The reason most often given for a decline in effective labor services 
relative to measured labor hours is that the number of young people and 
women has increased as a percentage of  total employment. This  argu- 
ment need have nothing to do with the intrinsic productivity of women 
compared with men. Women have much lower wage rates than men, and 
wage rates should measure marginal productivities. It may be that stan- 
dard practices and conventions confine women to low-productivity jobs. Martin Neil  Baily  9 
In that case, productivity can be improved by making better jobs available 
to women. Or women may be less productive than men because they have 
less  market experience on  average. This  same argument applies more 
forcefully to young people. 
Even if one accepts the validity of demographic adjustments in prin- 
ciple, in practice there are some awkward data problems to overcome in 
making demographic adjustments. George  Perry constructed a  demo- 
graphically adjusted measure of  labor input for  the nonfarm business 
sector by estimating hours worked by different demographic groups in 
the sector from the economy-wide data in Current Population Surveys. 
These were weighted by an estimate of the average relative wages of each 
group, which he assumed to be fixed through time.7 To illustrate the im- 
pact of this demographic adjustment, average growth rates for the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics series (output per hour, the conventional measure) 
and for the adjusted productivity series (output per effective hour)  are 
shown below for the nonfarm business sector.8 
1950-68  1968-73  1973-79 
Actual values 
Output  per hour  2.41  1.89  0.64 
Output  per effective  hour  2.62  2.25  0.98 
Difference  0.21  0.36  0.35 
Cyclically  adjusted  values 
Output  per hour  2.31  2.16  0.92 
Output  per effective  hour  2.52  2.59  1.38 
Difference  0.21  0.43  0.46 
The  demographic adjustment makes some  difference. It  reduces labor 
input growth, thus raising the corresponding productivity growth in all 
periods, but particularly after 1968. Comparing 1950-68  with 1968-73, 
the adjustment would account for a productivity slowdown of 0.15  per- 
centage point a year, or 0.22  point in the cyclically adjusted estimates. 
7. George L. Perry, "Labor  Force Structure,  Potential Output,  and Productivity," 
BPEA, 3:1971, pp. 533-65.  Jeffrey M. Perloff and Michael L. Wachter have also 
considered the importance of  demographic adjustment to  productivity. See "The 
Productivity Slowdown: A Labor Problem?" in Federal Reserve Bank of  Boston, 
The Decline in Productivity  Growth, Conference Series 22 (FRBB, 1980), pp. 115- 
42. 
8. The demographically adjusted series was  updated by  Thomas C.  Hier of 
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However, comparing the last two periods, the demographic adjustment 
has comparable effects in each so that it cannot account for any produc- 
tivity slowdown between those two periods. 
EDUCATION 
The growth accounting studies cited in table 1 used a measure of labor 
input that is adjusted for labor quality. But, for example, Denison's labor- 
quality index has been rising fairly rapidly since 1968, not falling. This is 
because  he  adjusts for years of  schooling  as well  as for demographic 
changes. The logic of wage-weighting that justified the demographic ad- 
justment also suggests an adjustment for education. 
Hypotheses about declining labor quality, therefore, do have to con- 
front the trend of rising education level.  To  argue that quality has de- 
clined, one has to  show that additional education has not  contributed 
much to the real productivity of workers. If Michael Spence is correct 
and people  acquire years of  schooling  in order to  signal their ability,9 
substantial increases in the average level  of  education will  not  add to 
overall productivity and may even reduce the efficiency of the labor mar- 
ket in assigning people to jobs. Even if Spence is only partly correct, there 
is reason to think that the marginal product of additional education (at 
least in its ability to produce measured output)  is low. Richard Freeman 
has found that the average return to education has been falling, and J. P. 
Smith and Finis Welch have argued that the overcrowding of the baby- 
boom generation has contributed.10  Education is heavily subsidized and 
is often acquired as a consumption good. The market test for human capi- 
tal investment is not equivalent to the market test for physical capital. 
In contrast to the improvements in average education in earlier years, it 
seems unlikely that the further increases of recent years have been im- 
portant. People  streaming through community colleges  and law schools 
may not be gaining as much human capital as the added years of educa- 
tion imply based on  historical evidence.  In  any case,  to  contribute to 
9.  Michael  Spence,  "Job  Market  Signaling,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
vol. 87 (August 1973), pp. 355-74. 
10. R. B. Freeman, The Overeducated  American (Academic Press, 1976); and 
James P. Smith and Finis  R. Welch,  The Overeducated  American?  A Review  Article, 
P-6253 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., November 1978). Martin Neil Baily  11 
speeding the productivity trend, gains  in  education  attainment would 
have to have speeded up, and this seems especially dubious. 
COHORT-SPECIFIC  CHANGES  IN  THE  QUALITY  OF  LABOR 
The evidence cited most often to indicate a decline in the labor quality 
of younger cohorts is the downward trend in Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT)  scores. These scores have been declining since 1963 after showing 
a slight upward trend for some years. The cohort of students born in 1945 
achieved an average of 478 on the verbal part of the test and 502 on the 
mathematical part when their scores were recorded in 1963.  This com- 
pares with students born in  1962 who averaged 424  on the verbal and 
466  on the mathematical parts. These raw figures overstate the amount 
of quality change, however, because there was a considerable increase in 
the proportion of high school  students taking the test. This apparently 
explains about half of the decline in scores overall, and nearly all the 
decline before 1973.11 
Whatever the significance of these changes, SAT scores are not a suffi- 
ciently reliable measure of cohort labor quality to be used in making a 
direct adjustment of  the data on labor hours.  Rather than attempting 
such a direct adjustment, the cohort-quality hypothesis is explored by 
means of  a simple simulation experiment. It is assumed that there are 
vintages  of  labor,  with  individuals  categorized by  year  of  birth. The 
cohort of people born in year T will display individual differences within 
their cohort, but as those people grow up they will have certain experi- 
ences in common that affect labor productivity-including  the quality of 
schools attended, social attitudes toward work, or the influence of tele- 
vision. 
One hour of work supplied by a person born in the year r is modeled 
as v7 hours of effective labor input, where v7 can be greater or less than 
unity.12 The vintage factor v7 is assumed to remain constant over each 
person's working life. 
If N,t  is the number of labor hours supplied in year t by persons of 
11. Landon Y. Jones, "The Mystery of the Declining SAT Scores," Princeton 
Alumni Weekly (October 20, 1980), pp. 23-27. 
12. This specification assumes that variations in  labor quality can be  made 
equivalent  to variations in the quantity  of labor. 12  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
vintage r, and if LE is the total effective labor hours supplied in t by all 
workers, then 
(2)  LE  N-  CV 
where the summation extends between the oldest and youngest vintages 
active in year t. The total labor input supplied in year t, without adjust- 
ment for cohort quality, is simply L,-E  N7,, so that an index of overall 
labor quality in t can be defined from 
LE  NE  Tt v 
(3)  E a  t  VT 
L  ~Nt 
where the summations are taken as described above. The ratio of effec- 
tive labor input to actual labor input, which is the index of labor quality, 
is the weighted average of the quality indexes of all the cohorts currently 
employed, where the weights, O,t, are the fractions of total hours supplied 
by each cohort. 
To  determine whether plausible variations in  v7  could  account  for 
much of the productivity slowdown, a simulation was conducted in which 
one-half  of  the fluctuations of  labor productivity in the private sector 
around its trend (after cyclical adjustment) was attributed to variations 
in labor quality, LE/L.  The resulting series for labor quality is shown in 
table 4.13 The series remains fairly close to unity until 1968 and then drops 
to 0.93  by  1979-corresponding  to the fairly stable productivity trend 
until 1968 and the slowdown thereafter. 
To estimate the path of v7 that would generate the hypothesized path of 
overall labor quality, it is assumed that v7 can be expressed as an arbi- 
trary fourth-order polynomial in r. The parameters of the polynomial are 
then estimated after substituting back into equation 3. The last column of 
table 4 gives the resulting estimated values of v7, showing how successive 
generations (identified by their year of birth)  must have varied in their 
cohort quality, if these variations were responsible for the pattern of over- 
all labor quality assumed in the first column.14 
13. The actual specification  used was ln(LE/L)  =  O.5(ln p -  Inp{), where In p 
and lInjp  are the actual and fitted values from equation 1 for the total private econ- 
omy. The trend and cyclical coefficients  are applied to the entire 1949-79 period. 
14. Persons born well before 1933 were in the labor force in 1949, and the esti- 
mated parameters  of the polynomial take this into account. But the estimated cohort- 
quality index remains  close to unity before 1933, so earlier years have been omitted 
from the table. Martin Neil  Baily  13 
Table 4.  Change in Cohort-Specific Labor Quality Consistent with Half the 
Productivity Shortfall,  1949-79 
Assumed  overall  Implied  cohort- 
Year  labor  quality  index  Year  of birth  quality  index 
1949  0.992  1933  0.992 
1950  1.000  1934  0.996 
1951  0.998  1935  1.000 
1952  0.999  1936  1.003 
1953  1.007  1937  1.007 
1954  1.006  1938  1.010 
1955  1.004  1939  1.013 
1956  0.995  1940  1.015 
1957  1.002  1941  1.016 
1958  1.005  1942  1.017 
1959  0.994  1943  1.016 
1960  0.999  1944  1.015 
1961  0.998  1945  1.012 
1962  1.000  1946  1.008 
1963  1.001  1947  1.001 
1964  1.004  1948  0.994 
1965  1.002  1949  0.984 
1966  1.001  1950  0.971 
1967  0.997  1951  0.957 
1968  0.996  1952  0.939 
1969  0.986  1953  0.919 
1970  0.984  1954  0.896 
1971  0.987  1955  0.869 
1972  0.985  1956  0.838 
1973  0.982  1957  0.804 
1974  0.969  1958  0.765 
1975  0.969  1959  0.722 
1976  0.967  1960  0.674 
1977  0.958  1961  0.621 
1978  0.942  1962  0.563 
1979  0.931  1963  0.499 
Source: Calculations by the author based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See the text for 
an explanation of the labor- and cohort-quality indexes. 
The decline in the labor quality of the cohort would have to have been 
very sharp indeed-from  an index of  about  1.0  for those born in the 
1940s to about 0.5 for those born in the early 1960s. In my view, such a 
sharp decline is implausible and of a much larger magnitude than any- 
thing implied by the SAT scores or related evidence, which suggests that 
the cohort-quality hypothesis can at most explain a small fraction of the 
slowdown. 
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lation was conducted using an overall labor quality series derived from 
the nonfarm business sector, with productivity adjusted for both cyclical 
and demographic factors. Because  demographics explain some slowing 
of the productivity trend, the overall labor quality series dropped only to 
0.96 percent by 1979, rather than to 0.93 percent as reported in table 4. 
But the cohort-quality series dropped almost to 0.5 because most of the 
decrease in overall quality came in the last few years of the 1970s, imply- 
ing a sharp deterioration in vintage quality at that time. 
The  demographic  adjustment  hypothesis  and  the  cohort-quality 
hypothesis differ sharply in their predictions for future productivity. The 
former predicts that productivity growth will improve as young workers 
and women acquire experience and age; the latter, a disastrous future for 
productivity-unless  cohort quality improves sharply-as  the low-quality 
younger workers become an increasingly important part of the total effec- 
tive hours supplied by the work force. 
HOURS  SPENT  WORKING 
Official measures of  labor input and productivity are based  on  the 
number of hours for which workers are paid. Other things being equal, a 
1 percent reduction in hours actually worked relative to hours paid will 
reduce measured labor productivity by 1 percent. There are two different 
questions concerning this discrepancy. First, how much time are people 
actively working during the hours when they are actually at their place of 
work? Second, how much time is paid for but not spent at work because 
of holidays, vacations, and sick leave? 
Frank Stafford and Greg Duncan have presented some findings on the 
first question, based upon time diaries completed by a sample of several 
hundred working men and women in the mid-1970s.15 They found that 
the average worker spends a considerable amount of time at work but not 
working. But because only one year of data are available, it is hard to say 
whether this phenomenon has increased or decreased, let alone whether 
it has accelerated. One suspects that the average worker has always taken 
a fair amount of slack time. 
There is more information on the second question, although still not 
15. Frank Stafford  and Greg J. Duncan, "The Use of Time and Technology by 
Households in the United States," Working  Paper Series (University of Michigan, 
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the full time-series that would be necessary to make a definitive state- 
ment about breaks in trend. The  Bureau of  Labor Statistics surveyed 
about 3,200  establishments periodically from  1966  to  1977  and deter- 
mined the relation between work hours and hours of paid leave.16 These 
surveys indicate that the gap between hours at work and hours paid has 
been widening slowly and fairly steadily during the course of the surveys. 
The average rate of decline of hours at work relative to hours paid over 
the eleven-year period was 0.16  percent a year, with the gap reaching 
7.6 percent by 1977. This decline helps determine the measured produc- 
tivity trend; but without a break in the rate of decline, it cannot account 
for any change in the trend.17 
SUMMARY  OF  LABOR  INPUT 
Considering  the  three  hypotheses  about  labor  services  together- 
demographics, cohort-specific quality change, and time on  the job-it 
appears that the growth of  effective labor services has  slowed  a little 
relative to the growth of measured total labor hours. Weighing the evi- 
dence subjectively, a decline in labor services relative to measured labor 
input accounted for a slowdown of perhaps 0.30 percentage point in the 
measured rate of labor productivity growth since  1968  in the total pri- 
vate economy,  with demographic changes accounting for most  of  this 
decline.18 
Capital Stock and Capital Services 
Trends in capital-labor ratios for several sectors are shown in table 3 
above. The growth rate of the capital-labor ratio in the broad aggregates 
has slowed, and there is no reason to doubt that this has contributed to 
16.  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Employee  Compensation  in the Private  Noni- 
farm Economy, 1977, Summary  80-5 (BLS, April 1980). 
17. Stafford and Duncan also address the question of  the decline in hours at 
work relative to hours paid and find a larger decline from 1965 and 1975 than that 
shown in the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. However, the authors' estimates are 
based  on a rather  small sample. 
18. The effect on subsectors  may be uneven. Employment in manufacturing  may 
not have experienced  the same demographic  changes as the economy as a whole. 16  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
the slowing of the growth rate of labor productivity. In the private busi- 
ness sector, if the contribution of  capital to production is given by its 
25 percent share of income, the decline in the growth rate of the capital- 
labor ratio after 1968 could account for a decrease in labor productivity 
growth of 0.39 percentage point a year. Furthermore, the different  pattern 
of growth in the capital-labor ratio in manufacturing helps explain why 
productivity in  that  sector  has  behaved  differently from  productivity 
measured for the other broad aggregates. 
Beyond  these observations, however, it becomes  difficult to  explain 
the slowdown of labor productivity based upon the standard capital-labor 
ratios. The ratios grew more slowly in 1957-68  than in 1948-57  for most 
sectors in table 3, but there is no corresponding decline in the growth of 
labor productivity. In manufacturing and the nonfinancial corporate busi- 
ness sectors the growth rates of the capital-labor ratio after 1957  show 
no relation or a perverse relation to labor productivity growth. 
The growth accounting studies of Denison  and Fraumeni-Jorgenson 
also imply little  importance for  capital in  explaining the  productivity 
slowdown. Both  studies use more comprehensive definitions of  capital 
than table 3 and analyze a broad output measure. As table 1 shows, both 
studies reveal sharp slowdowns in the growth of total factor productivity, 
a concept that already takes account of the growth in capital, and thus 
they identify a slowdown that is independent of the capital stock. 
The limited ability of the capital-labor ratio to explain medium-term 
productivity trends is puzzling. If a cross section of countries is compared, 
a fairly strong correlation exists between the growth of capital and that 
of productivity.19  Cross-section analyses of data on U.S.  industries and 
firms also reveal such a relation. But something seems to happen over 
time to disturb that relation. If the flow of capital services changes rela- 
tive to the stock of capital, the change could explain the puzzle, and this 
is the argument I make below.20 
19. Laurits  R. Christensen,  Diane Cummings, and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Relative 
Productivity  Levels, 1947-1973: An International  Comparison,"  paper presented  at 
the International  Seminar on Macroeconomics at Oxford, June 22-24,  1980; and 
Kendrick,  "International  Comparisons  of Recent Productivity  Trends." 
20.  In a previous paper I have argued in terms of  mismeasurement  of  capital 
rather than in terms of the flow of capital services relative to the measured  stock. I 
am grateful to Ernst Berndt for helpful conversations  on this point. See Martin N. 
Baily, "The Productivity Growth Slowdown and Capital Accumulation,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol.  71  (May  1981,  Papers  and Proceedings,  1980),  pp.  326-3  1. Martin Neil  Baily  17 
STRUCTURAL  CHANGE  AND  CAPITAL  SERVICES 
What enters the production function is not the stock of capital but the 
flow of capital services, and substantial changes can take place in the flow 
of services from a given plant. A plant can operate three shifts seven days 
a week, or eight hours a day for five days. It can be on short time or be 
closed  temporarily. It  can be  scrapped because  of  obsolescence  even 
though it has not worn out and still appears in statistical measures of the 
capital stock. 
Previous studies have addressed some of these issues surrounding the 
measurement of capital services. Some have measured labor input by full- 
time equivalent workers rather than total hours, based on the hypothesis 
that this more accurately reflects the hours worked by capital. Some part 
of the cyclical correction of productivity can also be viewed as an attempt 
to adjust for changes in capital services that come from variations in the 
utilization rate. And finally, the debate about the relative merits of the 
gross and net capital stock is really about which concept better approxi- 
mates the flow of capital services.21 
These adjustments to the capital stock may be in the right direction, 
but they do not go far enough. As Martin Feldstein and Michael Roths- 
child have stressed, depreciation and scrapping are primarily economi- 
cally determined and are only partially parameters of physical decay.22 
A  factory that is scrapped, extensively modified, or is put on reduced 
hours of operation has probably not worn out; it has become uneconomic. 
Individual  components  need  replacement,  and  certainly  maintenance 
costs rise over time. But obsolescence is usually more important in deter- 
mining economic value. The standard data on capital stock take no ac- 
count of variations in scrapping rates, utilization rates, or the extent to 
which capital spending is used to modify old plants because of changes in 
factor price or in product mix. 
But if the slowdown in productivity growth is to be explained by a 
decline in capital services, it is necessary to do more than point out that 
it could have happened. One wants to know that it did happen and why. 
21.  See the paper  by Norsworthy and others, "The  Slowdown,"  and the comment 
on that paper  by Denison. 
22. Martin  S. Feldstein and Michael Rothschild, "Towards  an Economic Theory 
of Replacement  Investment,"  Econometrica,  vol. 42 (May 1974), pp. 393-423. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
I argue that market valuation offers evidence that it did happen. On the 
question of  why,  I  contend  that major structural changes  have  taken 
place that have rendered old capital obsolete. The past fifteen years have 
been a period of considerable turmoil for the U.S. economy, and indeed 
for much of the world economy. When major changes in factor price or 
in product price occur and technology choice is embodied in the capital 
stock, structural  change causes capital obsolescence and a decline in capi- 
tal services. The rise in the price of energy after 1973 had some of these 
consequences, and I turn to it next. 
Energy.  Many have attributed the productivity slowdown to the rise 
in the price of energy, one of the most dramatic of the structural changes 
of the 1970s. Energy prices started to edge up in the late 1960s and then 
jumped in 1973 and again in 1979; thus the timing is right. The energy 
crisis is a worldwide phenomenon and so is the productivity slowdown. 
Edward Hudson  and Dale  Jorgenson and Ernst Berndt and David 
Wood have advanced the hypothesis that capital, which is energy-using, 
has become more expensive relative to labor as a result of  the energy 
crisis, and this has led to a substitution of labor for capital.23  The impor- 
tance of this mechanism was questioned because the growth in the capital- 
labor ratio had not slowed by enough to explain much of the productivity 
slowdown. But if the hypothesis of the present paper is correct and capi- 
tal services have declined relative to the measured capital stock, capital- 
energy interactions need to be reexamined. 
Efforts to save energy will reduce capital services. Energy-inefficient 
vintages of capital will be utilized less intensively and scrapped earlier fol- 
lowing a rise in energy prices.24  Moreover, some part of capital spending 
will be devoted to improving energy efficiency rather than to deepening 
capital, although it will  still be recorded as an addition to  the capital 
23.  Ernst R. Berndt and David 0.  Wood, "Engineering  and Econometric Inter- 
pretations of Energy Capital Complementarity,"  American Economic Review, vol. 
69 (June 1979), pp. 342-54. Edward A. Hudson and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Energy 
Prices and the U.S.  Economy,  1972-1976," Natural Resources Journal, vol.  18 
(October 1978), pp. 877-97. 
24.  The example of automobiles  suggests that variation in the use intensity may 
be more important than scrapping. Households are driving less  (or  are driving 
energy-inefficient  cars less) but not scrapping  earlier. The automobile story is com- 
plicated, however, by the fact that marginal vintage automobiles (1970-73)  are 
substantially  more fuel-efficient  than the subsequent  vintage (1974-75). Martin  Neil Baily  19 
stock. Thus the ability of a given measured capital stock to produce mea- 
sured output is reduced. 
Higher energy prices will also cause shifts in product demand that can- 
not be met by conversion and that result in "structural unemployment" 
of the capital stock in some sectors and capital shortages in others. For 
example, there has been a dramatic reduction in the growth of demand 
for electricity. Because  decisions  regarding capital purchase are made 
years in  advance in  the  electric  generating industry, persistent excess 
capacity has resulted. This product-specific capital cannot be used else- 
where. Other shifts in  the product mix,  due to  causes  besides  energy 
prices, create the same problem. 
Higher energy prices also make capital obsolete by changing the nature 
of the products. Producers of energy-using products will redesign them 
to be more energy-efficient and convert their capital stock to  produce 
new types of product. The most familiar example is the automobile indus- 
try, in which the shift of demand from large cars and large engines has 
caused a major restructuring of the industry and its capital stock. Air- 
craft, machine tools,  appliances, and construction  are all  sectors  that 
have energy-using durable goods as their output. 
Quantitative Impact  of  Energy.  Based  upon  the  1973-76  period, 
George Perry suggested that energy could not have been a major cause of 
the productivity slowdown because the cost of energy is not a sufficiently 
large fraction of GNP and not enough energy had been saved to justify 
the sacrifice of output implied by the productivity slowdown.25  That argu- 
ment requires two amendments, one conceptual and one to bring the facts 
up to  date. To  the extent that investment is  devoted  to  energy saving 
rather  than to conventional purposes that expand output and productivity, 
the capital stock will overstate the output that can be produced. However, 
the timing between output lost and energy saved need not coincide. When 
investment is redirected to energy conservation, the discounted value of 
forgone output should not exceed the discounted value of energy saved, 
ignoring possible differences in uncertainty between the two alternatives. 
But if energy savings are expected to continue for a longer time than the 
25.  George L. Perry, "Potential Output: Recent Issues and Present Trends," in 
Center  for  the  Study  of  American  Business,  U.S.  Productive  Capacity:  Estimating 
the Utilization Gap, Working Paper 23 (CSAB, Washington University, St. Louis, 
1977), pp. 1-20  (Brookings Reprint 336, 1978). 20  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
forgone output that is sacrificed, in the early years the output lost may 
exceed the energy saved. If energy-saving investment takes place at the 
expense of investment in short-lived equipment, for instance, there will 
be a presumption that the two time-streams differed in this way. 
The  argument applies  to  investment  for  producing energy-efficient 
products as well as to investment that conserves energy in the production 
process itself. Energy will be saved using the efficient product over its 
entire lifetime. The discounted value of these savings justifies a higher 
product price  (in  general not measured as a quality improvement and 
hence not counted as higher output)  which, in turn, justifies investment 
in producing the more efficient product. Again, the capital stock over- 
states the measured output that can be produced. What is more, com- 
pared with investing to  save energy in the production process,  energy 
savings  over  the  product's lifetime  further stretches  the  time  during 
which those  savings occur relative to the time during which output is 
forgone by sacrificing the alternative-conventional  investment. 
As of 1979, energy conservation in the United States had become sub- 
stantial, as shown below. 
Energy consumption  by end-use sector 
(quads per year) 
1948  1968  1973  1979 
Total energy  consumed  32.96  61.32  74.61  78.95 
Residential  and commercial  9.16  21.09  27.40  29.32 
Industrial  14.73  24.70  29.69  29.84 
Transportation  9.07  15.53  18.53  19.79 
Between  1948  and 1968,  energy use increased by  3.10  percent a year 
while GNP grew by 3.85 percent a year. This trend of rising energy pro- 
ductivity was then broken from 1968 to 1973, when energy use increased 
by 3.92  percent a year, while GNP rose by 3.41  percent a year. From 
1973 to 1979, the use of energy went up at a rate of 0.94 percent a year, 
while GNP rose by 2.78  percent a year. It is hard to say precisely what 
energy-productivity trends would  have  been.  But,  most  likely,  energy 
consumption was down between 10 and 15 percent, or 8 to  10 quads a 
year, by 1979, depending upon whether one projects that, in the absence 
of the price rise, the energy-GNP ratio would have stayed the same or 
risen as it had in the previous five years. The breakdown by sector shown 
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ment consumption in  residential and commercial  or in  transportation 
uses. But there has been essentially zero growth of energy consumption in 
the industrial sector since  1973,  which  suggests the business  sector is 
doing its share of energy saving. 
Perry estimated that energy use was down 3 to 5 percent relative to 
trend by  1976  and that this might account for 0.2  percentage point in 
annual productivity growth between  1973  and  1976.26  Because  energy 
use had fallen 10 to 15 percent below trend by 1979, up to 0.4 percentage 
point a year of productivity slowdown between  1976  and 1979 may be 
accounted for by his type of calculation. If the output loss in these years 
exceeds the value of energy savings because of the timing differences dis- 
cussed above, the output and productivity losses  may have been  even 
greater. This paper does not argue that the energy crisis has been the only 
cause of  the  decline  in  capital  services  and hence  productivity; other 
adjustment problems have also been important. But the reasoning pre- 
sented here shows that energy saving could account for a noticeable part 
of the productivity slowdown. 
Foreign Trade.  Another important source of changing production in 
the U.S. economy has come from foreign trade. Table 5 shows how the 
economy has become increasingly involved in world trade since World 
War II,  particularly in the past fifteen years. During this period both 
exports and imports of merchandise have risen sharply relative to total 
goods output. Exports and imports (excluding petroleum)  totaled 31.1 
percent of goods output by 1979, more than double the 1968 share.27 
On balance, the United States is not being overwhelmed by foreign 
competition.  Once  the  overvalued  dollar  was  devalued,  exports  grew 
rapidly. The overall trade balance remains positive today if the huge in- 
crease in petroleum imports is excluded.  But the big increase in  total 
trade has meant shifting resources and has brought adjustment problems 
in specific industries. 
Between  1968  and  1978  net  exports of  agricultural goods  climbed 
from $230  million to $13.26  billion; net exports of chemicals increased 
from $2.04 billion to $6.60 billion; net exports of capital goods rose from 
26.  Ibid., pp. 10, 12. 
27.  For a discussion of the change in the role of trade in the U.S. economy, see 
William H. Branson, "Trends  in United States International  Trade and Investment 
since World War II," in Martin Feldstein,  ed., The American  Economy  in Transition 
(The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 183-257. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 5. Merchandise  Trade  and  Total Goods  Output,  Selected  Years, 1948-79 
Percent  unless  otherwise  indicated 
Merchandise  trade  as a percent  of goods  output 
Total  trade 
Output  of goods  (imports  plus 
Year  (billions  of dollars)  Importsa  Exports  export.s)a 
1948  154.4  4.61b  8.12  12.73 
1965  338.4  5.69  8.02  13.71 
1968  421.3  7.33  8.12  15.45 
1973  604.1  10.24  11.63  21.87 
1979  1,055.9  14.23  16.91  31.14 
Sources:  Goods  output-Economic  Report  of  the  Presidenit,  Janiuary  1981,  p.  240;  merchandise  trade 
-Survey  of  Current  Businzess, various  issues. 
a.  Excludes petroleum. 
b. Includes petroleum. 
$8.29 billion to $26.77  billion.28  During the same period, net imports of 
consumer goods grew from $3.04  billion to $17.89  billion, net imports 
of fuels and lubricants from $1.46  billion to $38.42  billion, and net im- 
ports of  "other" industrial materials from $4.57  billion  to  $15.06  bil- 
lion.29 Within these broad categories, competitive changes in steel  and 
automobiles have been especially noticeable. William Branson notes that 
the United States "has steadily lost its comparative advantage in iron and 
steel in general," but has maintained competitiveness in advanced steel 
products.30 Trade in  automobile  products went  from  a  net  deficit of 
$842 million in 1968 to $9.85 billion ten years later. 
On balance,  trade is  beneficial.  The  mobility  and high  educational 
level of the U.S. labor force are advantages when adaptation is needed. 
But in an economy that traditionally has had a low level  of investment 
and low capital turnover, the benefits of trade are achieved only with sub- 
stantial transitional costs. Changing trade patterns can make capital re- 
dundant or obsolete. The pace and importance of such change has ac- 
celerated for the United States in the 1970s. 
Regulation and Defense Spending.  The decade of the 1970s has seen 
the development of major regulatory programs to protect the environ- 
28.  Ibid., table 3.19, pp. 208-10.  The figures are in current dollars. The GNP 
deflator  rose from 82.5 to 150.1 during the same period. 
29.  "Other"  industrial materials do  not include agricultural goods, fuels and 
lubricants,  chemicals, or capital goods. Steel imports are an important  component  of 
this category. 
30.  Branson, "Trends in United States International Trade and Instruments," 
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ment and safety of  workers and consumers. These  programs have re- 
quired some new investment and the conversion of some existing capital. 
Available evidence indicates that only a small fraction of total investment 
has been allocated directly to pollution control and worker safety. But it 
is not easy to measure the full costs of converting production methods and 
modifying product designs. 
In 1944 spending on national defense was 41.5 percent of GNP. This 
percentage fell to 4.1 by 1948. The shift from guns to butter coming on 
the heels  of  the Great Depression  created a major problem of  capital 
obsolescence in the 1940s. Defense spending was in the range of 8 to 10 
percent of GNP for most of the 1950s and 1960s but fell to 4.6 percent by 
1979. This was a much smaller shift than that after World War II, but still 
caused a noticeable adjustment problem. 
CHANGES  IN  RELATIVE  PRICES 
Changes in the mix of production and the movements of resources into 
and out of sectors are linked to changes in the relative prices of different 
products. If the decade of the 1970s was a period of exceptional struc- 
tural change, this should show up in greater relative price dispersion. To 
test this, for each of three decades,  1949-59,  1959-69,  and 1969-79, 
changes in the deflators for gross product originating for fifty-seven sectors 
of the private economy3' were used to form relative price measures de- 
fined by 
(4)  RP%t  =  Pit  for i =  1, . . . , 57,  t =  1959, 1969, 1979. 
Pit-10 
The  mean  and dispersion of  these  relative price  measures are shown 
below. Although the price indexes are quite aggregative and could mask 
important relative price changes within sectors or changes in  product 
quality, they still show that the period of high average inflation in the 
1970s was also a time of exceptionally large relative price movements. 
1949-59  1959-69  1969-79 
Mean  1.344  1.268  1.957 
Variance  0.091  0.069  0.319 
Coefficient  of variation  0.224  0.207  0.289 
31. The price deflator  series are the same as those used by Hendrik Houthakker, 
except government was excluded. See Hendrik S. Houthakker, "Growth and Infla- 
tion: Analysis by Industry,"  BPEA, 1:1979, pp. 241-56. 24  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
OTHER  APPROACHES  TO  STRUCTURAL  CHANGE 
Structural changes and mix effects have been considered in the pro- 
ductivity literature before, but from a different perspective and with dif- 
ference  conclusions.32 One  approach has  been  to  decompose  overall 
average labor productivity growth into two parts: the weighted average of 
the productivity growth rates of the individual sectors of the economy, 
and the effect on average productivity from workers moving among sec- 
tors with differing levels of productivity. For example, it is argued that 
average productivity rose as workers left  agriculture in the  1940s  and 
1950s  (a  sector with low labor productivity)  and moved into industry 
(with high labor productivity). When the migration ended in the 1960s, 
some decline in productivity growth inevitably occurred. Similarly, Lester 
Thurow argues that growth in average productivity has recently been de- 
pressed because much of the employment created in the 1970s took place 
in low-productivity sectors. 
This line of reasoning can be interpreted correctly and incorporated 
into the central hypothesis of this paper. But the simple intuitive logic 
behind the  approach is not valid.  The  effect of  reallocating labor de- 
pends on differences in marginal productivity rather than in average labor 
productivity. Presumably average productivities differ among sectors be- 
cause of variations in capital-labor ratios (including differences in human 
capital and natural resources).  Workers moving into a low-productivity 
sector have low average productivity only because they have little capital 
with which to work. If total capital services in the economy are correctly 
measured, it is double counting to suggest that an additional explanation 
of productivity trends is to be found in mix effects. 
There are two possibilities for salvaging the intuition about the agricul- 
ture and service sectors. One is to argue that market inefficiencies have 
resulted in differences in marginal products. This may be true, especially 
for the earlier move away from agriculture, although it is doubtful that 
such inefficiencies contribute to understanding the recent experience or 
the effect of industry mix shifts in general. 
32. See William D.  Nordhaus, "The Recent Productivity Slowdown," BPEA, 
3:1972, pp. 493-536;  and Lester C. Thurow, "The Productivity Problem," paper 
prepared  for the Ontario  Economic Council, November 1980. Martin Neil Baily  25 
The second possibility is to consider the consequence at the sectoral 
level of the kind of capital obsolescence  that has been hypothesized in 
this paper. If the industrial sector of the economy has been hit by struc- 
tural change and its effective available capital input reduced, it is likely 
that employment creation in this sector would be slowed  and that the 
relative share of  employment  in  the  service  sector  would  rise.  Thus 
Thurow's observation about where the jobs have come from in the 1970s 
may be a symptom of the decline of capital services suggested here. In 
general, shifts in the mix of employment that correspond to changes in 
economy-wide  capital services will  show  up  as  slowdowns  in  average 
productivity growth. The  slowdown,  however, is  accounted for by the 
lower ratio of capital services to labor in the aggregate. 
Capital Services and Market Value 
Under certain assumptions, capital obsolescence can result in a decline 
in effective capital services and hence in labor productivity growth. This 
will be shown in a vintage capital model in which the market value of the 
capital stock provides an accurate measure of the flow of effective capital 
services. It is based upon the vintage capital model developed by Robert 
Solow.33  There is only one sector, and output Q is either for consumption 
or for investment. Thus the price of new capital goods is always equal to 
unity. Once a unit of the output has been formed into capital, however, 
the state of technology at the time it was produced is embodied in the 
capital good. This means that at time t the output, Q,(t),  from capital of 
vintage v is 
(5)  Q,(t) =  A,(t)F[L(t),  K,(t), v], 
where F is the vintage production function, L,  is the amount of labor 
employed on capital of vintage v(Kr),  and A,  is a multiplicative term to 
be explained below. It is assumed that technological progress is taking 
33. Robert M.  Solow,  "Investment and Technical Progress," in  Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Samuel Karlin, and Patrick Suppes,  eds., Mathematical  Methods  in the Social 
Sciences, 1959  (Stanford University Press, 1960),  pp. 89-104.  John Shoven and 
Arthur Slepian have considered the effect of  energy and obsolescence on market 
valuation. See John B. Shoven and Arthur P. Slepian, "The Effect of Factor Price 
Changes on Replacement Investment and Market Valuation," Discussion Paper 19 
(Workshop  on the Microeconomics  of Inflation,  Stanford  University, October 1978). 26  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
place  so  that  for  increasing  v  each  new  vintage  of  capital  is  more 
productive. 
After an initial investment, IV,  in vintage v capital (that is, for t >  v), 
two kinds of deterioration take place. The first is that the capital suffers 
physical decline; it wears out. This is assumed to take the form of ex- 
ponential decay at a rate 8. Thus the amount of vintage v capital available 
at time t is 
(6)  Kv(t) =Ive-6(t-v)  t >  v. 
The second deterioration comes about because the output itself pro- 
duced by Kv(t)  becomes obsolete. This is used to capture both the effect 
of structural change in a world in which capital is product-specific and 
the effect of a factor-price change on the value-added produced by old 
capital.34  These events cannot be captured realistically in a model as sim- 
ple as this one. But technological change is also a complex process, and 
people accept very simple modeling of that process. To allow for obsoles- 
cence induced by structural  change, it is assumed that 
(7)  Av(t)=  Ae-=(t-v) 
which implies that the effective output produced by old capital declines as 
capital ages. 
Workers are assumed to earn the same real wage, W(t),  wherever they 
work. Because of this common wage and because new vintages of capital 
are more productive than old ones, labor is gradually withdrawn from old 
capital. In practice this reduction in the utilization of old capital usually 
takes the form of  a reduction in  the number of  shifts worked  or the 
number of short- or long-term plant closings, because variations in the 
flow of capital services deriving from a given capital stock are the prin- 
cipal form of  ex-post capital-labor substitution (although not the only 
form). The specification of the production function in equation 5 assumes 
a "putty-putty" technology, which implies that old capital does not die 
at some specific point in time, but instead gradually fades  away. This 
explanation does  capture, in a general way, the empirically important 
phenomenon of declining utilization. 
In general, vintage models have no capital aggregates. The entire his- 
34. If the price of energy rises and new capital is more energy-efficient,  its value- 
added is greater  than that of old capital. One could also model the retrofitting  of old 
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tory of investment must be specified to determine output. In the special 
case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, there is an aggregate and 
the model can be analyzed simply. It is assumed, therefore, that the vin- 
tage production function can be written as 
(8)  F(.)  =  eYvLv(t)aK,(t)1-a. 
The condition that the employment of labor on capital of vintage v be 
determined by equality between the marginal product and the wage gives 
(9)  L J(t)  =  IV(/))1(1a)  eave-bt 
where a is 8 +  (0 +  y) /(  -  a)  and b is 8 +  0/ ( 1-  a).  This condition 
determines the employment on any vintage v depending on the level of the 
economy-wide wage, W. For the economy as a whole, however, the wage 
is endogenous and determined by total employment, L(t).  Total employ- 
ment is the sum of employment on all vintages and is expressed as 
(10)  L(t) =  fLv(t)  dv. 
Substituting for L, from equation 9 yields 
aA1 /(1-a)  f  (11)  L(t) =  (e)J_eavIv  dv 
which determines the wage in the economy for any level of total employ- 
ment and path of investment. 
Output from capital of vintage v, Q,  can be determined as a function 
of the wage,  W, the amount of vintage v capital in existence  (equal  to 
Ive-6(t-v) ) and parameters of the model. Thus 
(12)  Q(t)  =  I  eave-bt. 
Total output for the economy as a whole then is the sum of the output 
from all the vintages, 
(13)  Q(t) =  f!Qv(t)  dv 
=  A (  a  a)  e-btf  eavIv  dv. 
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tion 13 determining total output reveals that the endogenous wage,  W, 
can be substituted out and total output can be expressed as a function of 
total employment and the integral over I,. If a variable r is defined by 
(14)  F(t)=  f  eavI dv, 
-co 
total output can be expressed very simply as 
(15)  Q(t) =  Ae-b(l-a)tL(t)aT(t)l-a. 
This is one form of an aggregate production function, and the task now 
is to relate r(t)  to the market value of the capital stock. To determine 
market value, the quasi-rent at time t of vintage v capital is determined. 
This  is  defined as pv  (t)  and is  just equal to  the  marginal product of 
vintage v capital. Taking the derivative aQV/,aKV yields an equation in- 
volving L,,  the employment on vintage v capital, I,,, and the exponential 
terms in t and v. Then using the previous condition in equation 9 that 
determined Lv as a function of  W and substituting out the wage using 
equation 11 gives the quasi-rent, pv(t), as a function of total employment 
in the economy and the capital integral r, 
(16)  PV(t) =  (1  -  a)A  (t)  e(a-6ve-(O-6a)t. 
The market value of a unit of vintage v capital is then pv  (t)  given by 
(17)  pv(t)  =  pv(r)e-(6+r)(T-t)  dr, 
which is the present value of the stream of quasi-rents, with a discount 
rate, r. At time t there are Ive-6  (t-v) units of vintage v capital in existence, 
so the market value of all units of vintage v capital is 
(18)  Vv(t)  =  pv(t)Ive-(t-v). 
If investment is positive, the present value of the stream of quasi-rents 
of a unit of new capital of vintage t is equal to its purchase price. Because 
this price is equal to unity in a one-sector model, this condition becomes 
co 
(19)  pt(t) =  1  =  f  pt(7)e  (8+r)(T  t) dr. 
In the terminology of the Tobin-Brainard investment model, this is the 
condition that marginal q equals unity;35  it can simplify greatly the calcu- 
35. James Tobin and William C.  Brainard, "Asset Markets and the Cost of 
Capital," in Bela Belassa and Richard Nelson, eds., Economic Progress, Private 
Values,  and Public  Policy:  Essays  in Honor  of  William Fellner  (Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland, 1977), pp. 235-62. Martin Neil Baily  29 
lation of the market value of old capital. Equation 16 with v =  t can be 
substituted into equation 19. In calculating p,,  (t)  almost everything drops 
out, resulting in 
(20)  Vv(t) =  Ive-a(t-v) 
Then the market value of the entire capital stock is the sum of the market 
values of all the vintages, 
rt 
(21)  V(t) =  f  Vv(t)  dv =  e-atQ(t). 
This is the relation between the capital integral r and the market value of 
capital; substituting into equation 15 yields 
(22)  Q(t) =  AeYtL(t)aV(t)l-a. 
Thus this model of vintage capital does have a remarkable property. 
In the simple case of a Cobb-Douglas technology, there is an aggregate 
production function, and the aggregate measure of capital services in that 
function is equal to the perfect foresight market value of the capital stock. 
The reason is that the market value depends upon the stream of quasi- 
rents generated by the capital; each vintage of capital is weighted by its 
quasi-rent, and that is just the right set of weights to produce the aggre- 
gate measure of capital services. The model comes out so neatly because, 
in the framework of Cobb-Douglas and putty-putty technology, old capi- 
tal is equivalent to  some  smaller quantity of  new capital. So  a simple 
weighting system works exactly right. In a more general model, that would 
not be true. 
PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH  AND  CHANGES 
IN  THE  PARAMETERS 
The aggregate production function just obtained could be used directly 
to track output or productivity trends or to  compute the rate of  total 
factor productivity growth, if the observed actual market value were to be 
used for the perfect foresight market value. Below I combine actual mar- 
ket value and conventional capital stock measures to construct a capital 
input index. But before turning to that index, some additional implica- 
tions of the theory are worth considering. 
For simplicity assume that total labor input, L (t),  grows at a constant 30  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
rate, g,.  Then from equation 22 the rate of output growth is given by 
dl  Qdin  V 
(23)  Q =  Y +  agL  +  _)  t 
The growth rate of  V, in turn, depends upon the rate of investment, I, 
and on the parameters of the model. Specifically, 
(24)  dV 
= 
d 
[e-atp(t)]  =  -aV  +  I 
dlnV  _  (0+  I 
dt  I- 
New I obviously augments the stock of physical capital and its market 
value. Physical depreciation diminishes the stock of physical capital so 
that the higher is the depreciation rate, 8, the lower is the growth rate of 
market value for any given level  of gross investment, I.  It is  assumed 
henceforth that 8  is fixed. Technical  change embodied in  new  capital 
(occurring at rate y)  and obsolescence  of  the output from old  capital 
(occurring at rate 0)  are exactly equivalent in their impact on market 
value, although they are not equivalent in the model. The larger the sum 
of y and 0 is, the lower the growth rate of market value. The reason is 
that an increase in either parameter makes new capital relatively more 
attractive than old and lowers the relative price of old capital and hence 
market value. 
The  discussion  of  the  model  thus far is  based  upon  values  of  the 
parameters that are constant over time. A complete analysis of the case 
in which these parameters change is quite feasible in principle but awk- 
ward in practice. To show the most important implications of parametric 
shifts it is easier to ask how the relations in the model  are affected by 
alternative parameter values. I consider first a change in y. 
A  DECREASE  IN  THE  RATE  OF  EMBODIED 
TECHNICAL  CHANGE 
If there is an increase or a decrease in the rate of embodied technical 
change, y, there is no direct impact on the rate of output or labor produc- 
tivity growth. If the expression for the growth rate of V in equation 24 is 
substituted into equation 23, the result is 
(25)  dln  Q =  agL  + 
I 
-  61  _ 
0 
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The y has simply dropped out of the expression. Thus changes in y alter 
the rate of output and labor productivity growth only through their effects 
on investment, I,  and market value,  V. The intuitive reason for this is 
that if, for example, y declines, there are two offsetting effects: a smaller 
productivity increment is associated with new capital as a result of  its 
technical  advantage, but old  capital retains more labor  and produces 
more output, so that market value V is increased by the decline in y.36 
This increased rate of growth of capital services and market value, V, 
will lead to a decline in I/V  for any given path of gross investment. This 
in turn decreases output growth, and the process continues until the de- 
cline in output growth and productivity growth is just equal to the reduc- 
tion in the rate of technical change, y. This is the result one would expect. 
Finally, the path of investment itself will in general be altered by the 
change in y. The  rate of  economic  depreciation is  reduced by  such  a 
decline and this increases the net rate of profit. If the supply of savings 
to the business sector is elastic, it will increase the rate of gross invest- 
ment, acting as a partial offset to the decline in output and labor produc- 
tivity growth.37 
AN  INCREASE  IN  THE  RATE  OF  OBSOLESCENCE 
Although variations in the rate of output obsolescence,  0, and in the 
rate of embodied technical change, y, are equivalent in their impact on 
capital services and market value, they have different effects on produc- 
tivity. A rise in -y  increases the steady-state rate of output and productivity 
growth even though it reduces the effective flow of capital services from 
36. Even a discontinuous  change in a parameter  such as -y  will not cause a dis- 
continuous change in V, however. Market value in t depends upon the relative pro- 
ductivity  of old vintage capital and capital purchased  in t. If -y  has remained  constant 
up to time t and then changes for all time after t, this has only an infinitesimal  effect 
on the productivity of capital purchased from t to t +  dt. Since the price of new 
capital is always unity, the relative price of old vintage v capital, therefore, changes 
continuously.  In general, when a parameter  shifts it alters both the expected future 
path of investment and the discount rate. Under the strong equilibrium  conditions 
of the model (particularly  equations 17 and 19), the resulting  paths of these variables 
will be such that market  value does not jump. 
37. That a decline in the rate of technical progress encourages investment may 
seem counterintuitive.  In a model with disembodied  technical change this would not 
be true, but embodied technical change is associated with capital obsolescence and 
this turns out to be the dominant factor. This point is made by Robert M. Solow in 
Capital  Theory  and the Rate  of  Return  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1963),  p. 63. 32  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
old capital. An increase in 0, however, simply reduces the effective flow 
of capital services from old capital. 
If the economy has been growing in a period of relative tranquillity and 
then passes into  a period of  structural change, this is  modeled  as  an 
increase in 0. There will be an immediate impact on productivity growth. 
Labor is withdrawn from old capital and increased on new capital. The 
effective flow of capital services declines and the rate of growth of wages 
declines. New capital goods are just as advanced technologically as they 
were before. But the slower growth of wages is the market signal to own- 
ers of new capital goods to use a more labor-intensive technique in pro- 
duction. Thus both the increment to labor productivity growth coming 
from new additions to the capital stock and overall labor productivity 
growth are reduced. 
The direct impact of an increase of 1 percentage point in the obsoles- 
cence parameter is a decrease of 1 percentage point in labor productivity 
growth. Over time, however, the decrease in V associated with the de- 
crease in capital services means that I/V  rises for a given growth path of 
gross investment. This process must continue until the reduction in the 
productivity growth rate has been  eliminated. The  direct impact of  an 
increase in 0 on productivity growth is, therefore, temporary. 
The indirect impact of an increase in 0  on productivity is that it in- 
creases economic  depreciation, reduces the net rate of  profit, and dis- 
courages investment. Thus unless some offsetting policy change or other 
stimulus to investment is provided, a permanent increase in 0 discourages 
capital formation and productivity growth in the long run. 
If the economy ever returns to a period without structural change, so 
that 0 returns to its original level, a productivity growth bonus will result. 
THE  IMPACT  OF  PARAMETER  CHANGES 
ON  MARKET  VALUE  AND  TOBIN  's  q 
The puzzling trends in the ratio of the market value of corporate capi- 
tal to the replacement value of the capital stock (Tobin's average q)  have 
received almost as much attention as the productivity growth slowdown. 
It is easy to see in the vintage capital model what happens to this ratio 
under some assumptions about how a standard capital stock measure is 
computed. 
Suppose that at some initial time  (t  =  0)  the estimated size of  the Martin Neil Baily  33 
physical capital stock is K(0)  and is actually equal to the market value 
V(0).  Average q is  initially equal  to  unity. Suppose  further that the 
growth of K over time is then computed using gross investment, I,  and 
an assumed proportional depreciation rate, dK,  that at time zero accu- 
rately reflects the true depreciation rate-both  economic  and physical 
depreciation. Thus, 
(26)  dK  =  +  0(0)  +  y(O) 
I  -a 
As long as there is no change in y or 0, the estimated capital stock will 
remain equal to market value and will provide an accurate measure of 
the flow of capital services. 
But suppose y or 0 changes. If y declines, market value, V, will rise for 
the reasons given earlier. This means V will rise relative to the unaltered 
estimates of the capital stock. If the decline in y is  1 percentage point, 
capital's share of income (1  -  a)  is 0.25,  and the ratio of gross invest- 
ment to the capital stock is 0. 12, then V will rise until measured average q 
reaches 1.5. If the replacement cost value of the capital stock is calcu- 
lated correctly, with economic  depreciation slower than before because 
of the decline in y, its value will just keep up with the market value and 
the value of q will remain at 1.0. This correctly estimated K will continue 
to measure properly the flow of capital services. 
Similarly, if 0 increases by  1 percentage point, V declines relative to 
the (mis-)  measured value of the capital stock, and this process continues 
until q has reached 0.75.  A change of 2 percentage points in 0 results in 
a final q value of 0.60. 
Fairly moderate changes in technical change or obsolescence thus im- 
ply very substantial changes in q, the ratio of the market value of capital 
to the estimated replacement cost of the net stock. As I describe below, 
changes in market value have been so great that they overexplain the pro- 
ductivity slowdown  if market values  are used  to  measure the  flow  of 
capital services. Turning this around implies that, at most, capital obsoles- 
cence can explain only a part of the observed decline in market value. 
This point needs to be stressed. Nevertheless,  the link that this model 
implies between productivity trends and the puzzling large trend move- 
ments in q provides important empirical support for the basic hypothesis 
of the paper. It also should be emphasized that anyone who argues that 
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the rate of embodied technical change has to explain why the trend in 
average q  has  been  exactly  in  the  wrong  direction.  Slower  technical 
change maintains the value of existing capital and should thus raise mea- 
sured q. 
GROSS  AND  NET  PROFITS 
The vintage capital model predicts that if capital stock becomes obso- 
lete, average q, as it is usually measured, will decrease. One reason that 
the observed decline in average q has seemed so puzzling is that conven- 
tional profit calculations have shown the profit rate holding up fairly well 
in the 1970s.  Thus what this vintage model predicts about the behavior 
of gross and net profits is worth considering. 
Gross profits-the  total stream of quasi-rents from capital of all vin- 
tages-are  predicted to remain a constant share of  output because the 
aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas.  This means that if the 
flow of capital services is reduced because of obsolescence,  there is no 
reason to expect an equivalent decline in gross profits. Rather, the growth 
rate of gross profit will slow along with the growth of output. Obsoles- 
cence does  reduce the quasi-rents from old capital; and the decline in 
market value reflects the reduction in these quasi-rents. But the initial 
quasi-rents from new capital rise and maintain the level  of  total gross 
profit. This high initial quasi-rent is expected to decline rapidly as the new 
capital becomes old and obsolete. 
A study by William Brainard, John Shoven, and Laurence Weiss con- 
siders the relation between profit stream and market value. They compute 
a cash-out case in which "any new investment is assumed to break even; 
the present value of the firm is solely a reflection of past investment de- 
cisions. '38  They find the  decline in the market valuation  of  corporate 
capital to  be  a major puzzle using this cash-out  calculation. But  they 
ignore obsolescence and assume the quasi-rents from old and new capital 
are the same up to the point at which old capital is scrapped. They explain 
why this will give different results from those of a vintage model such as 
the one used in this paper: "The assumption that capital is a one hoss shay 
with returns to a unit of capital independent of its age is artificial. More- 
over, it does not explicitly take into account obsolescence, probably the 
38. William C. Brainard,  John B. Shoven, and Laurence Weiss, "The Financial 
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most important factor in determining actual lifetimes. Ignoring obsoles- 
cence leads to  an underestimate of the returns on new capital and an 
overestimate of the returns on old."39  Their calculation assigns the total 
gross profit evenly among capital of all ages. The vintage model does not. 
A conventional calculation of net profit or net rate of return to capital 
uses a depreciation rate that does not vary much over time. The assump- 
tion of equation 26, for example, implies that total depreciation is dKK. 
The estimate of net profit is then gross profit (denoted as 7r) minus dKK; 
the estimate of the net rate of profit is  (7r -  dKK)  /K.  Suppose the con- 
ventional capital stock estimate, K, grows at about the same rate as out- 
put. The vintage capital model predicts that 7r  also grows at the same rate 
as output. It follows that a conventional estimate of the net profit rate is 
predicted to remain constant, even when capital becomes obsolete. 
The correct measure of net profit, however, declines sharply with the 
obsolescence  of  capital.  Correct  economic  depreciation  is  equal  to 
8  +  (0  +  -y)/(1  -  a).  The first term is the physical depreciation; the 
second reflects economic depreciation. If the rate of obsolescence,  0, in- 
creases by 1 percentage point, the rate of economic depreciation increases 
by 4 points because 1 -  a  =  0.25.  It is this increase in economic depre- 
ciation and decrease in net profit that is reflected in the decline in market 
value. 
These predictions about profit accord reasonably well with develop- 
ments in the nonfinancial corporate sector. The nonlabor share of gross 
income has declined somewhat in the postwar period from 30.0 percent 
in 1948 to 25.1 percent in 1973, and 25.7 percent in 1979. Output grew 
at an average of 4.6 percent a year from 1948 to 1973 and only 2.9 per- 
cent annually from  1973  to  1979.  The  growth rate of  gross profit de- 
clined in the 1970s while the conventional measure of capital stock has 
grown roughly at the same rate as output. The constancy of the conven- 
tionally measured rate of  return on  capital has been noted  by Martin 
Feldstein and Lawrence Summers and by Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss.40 
The retention rate of corporations has increased and there has been a 
corresponding slowdown in dividend growth since 1968. Real dividends 
paid out by nonfinancial corporations grew by 3.95 percent a year from 
39. Ibid.,  p. 458. 
40. Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers, "Is the Rate of  Profit Falling?" 
BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 211-27; and Brainard,  Shoven, and Weiss, "The Financial Valu- 
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1948 to 1968 but were at about the same level in 1979 as in 1968. Cor- 
porations were paying out  a much smaller fraction of  gross profit to 
their stockholders in the 1970s than in the 1960s. This behavior is con- 
sistent with  a realization by  managers and stockholders that true net 
profit has declined relative to gross profit-that  is, economic depreciation 
has increased. 
Actual  Market  Value 
The theoretical model of the preceding section shows that changes in 
the ratio of the market value of capital to the measured physical capital 
stock could provide an estimate of changes in the flow of capital services 
relative to the measured capital stock. But  the model  uses  some  very 
restrictive assumptions, and the  market value  in  question is  a perfect 
foresight market value. In practice there are determinants of market value 
and of its ratio to capital, average q, that were not considered. Some of 
these reinforce the use of market value as a measure of capital services, 
but some of them weaken the relation. 
INTANGIBLE  CAPITAL 
Intangible capital-patents,  good will, organizational capital, and the 
appropriable part of firm-specific human capital-is  counted in a firm's 
market value but not as part of its physical capital stock. This fact gives 
the use of market value as a measure of capital an important advantage 
for productivity analysis. It may well be that the value of the stock of 
research and development "capital" has diminished in the past ten years 
as a result of the rise in the price of energy or of other structural changes, 
or because of a reduction in government-sponsored research. 
On the other hand, if firms have monopoly power that changes over 
time, the change will  be  reflected in market value.  But  there will  not 
be a corresponding movement of capital services. Eric Lindenberg and 
Stephen  Ross  find  no  relation  between  movements  in  the  four-firm 
concentration ratio and movements in q.41 But it may be  that foreign 
competition in some sectors has eroded market power. 
41.  Eric B. Lindenberg and Stephen A. Ross, "Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial 
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TAXES  AND  INTEREST  RATES 
The  market value of  capital is the present discounted value  of  the 
stream of quasi-rents. It can be altered, therefore, by taxes levied on the 
profit stream or by changes in the rate at which the stream is discounted. 
It has been argued that the effective tax rate on corporate income and the 
effective discount rate have both risen in the 1970s, perhaps as a result of 
inflation or increased risk. 
The important point is that variations in taxation and interest rates 
affect the present value of the returns to both old and new capital. If it is 
true that tax or discount rates have risen, both market value and the size 
of the capital stock should have been depressed. In equilibrium, average 
q should not be altered by a change in the discount rate or by general 
taxation of corporate income. Only those taxes that affect old and new 
capital differently will change their relative price-that  is, will change 
average q in the long run.42 
DISEQUILIBRIUM 
Consideration of taxes and interest rates does raise the possibility of 
disequilibrium movements in average q. The prices of old and new capital 
are equalized by variations in the flow of investment. But if there are costs 
of  adjusting the capital stock  or if  sellers  of  capital  goods  ration by 
stretching delivery times rather than raising price, the market value of old 
capital can change relative to the price of new capital in the short run, 
with no change in capital services. 
But disequilibrium movements in average q should be short run. It is 
hard to  accept disequilibrium as an explanation for the observed per- 
sistent trends in average q. The striking feature of the ratio of gross invest- 
ment to the capital stock in the nonfinancial corporate business sector is 
how stable it has been. Average q was low in the 1940s  and the 1970s 
42.  The investment  tax credit is an example of such a tax, and under some as- 
sumptions  the tax on dividends may be another. The paper by Lawrence Summers 
in this issue investigates  the impact of taxes. I am not persuaded  that his assumptions 
are the most appropriate.  But certainly in principle a tax-adjusted  q series should 
allow the construction of a capital services measure that is better than the actual 
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and yet the rate of investment was as high during those periods as its 
average for the 1950s and 1960s. All estimates of measured q were below 
equilibrium from  1973  to  1979,  which should have  implied that cor- 
porations were trying to shed capital. In fact, however, they invested at a 
fairly high rate-enough  to  raise their estimated net  capital  stock  by 
17 percent.43 
IRRATIONALITY  AND  VOLATILITY 
If investors are ignorant or irrational or do not predict future returns 
well,  market value  could  be  a poor  guide to  capital  services. Franco 
Modigliani and Richard Cohn have suggested that stockholders discount 
future earnings by the nominal interest rate rather than by the real rate.44 
The increase in inflation and the nominal rate of interest, they argue, can 
explain the decline in market value in the 1970s. There are several prob- 
lems with this hypothesis. First, as was pointed out earlier, real interest 
rate illusion  should depress both market value and investment but not 
average q  (except  in the short run).  Second, the Modigliani and Cohn 
model  incorporates an implausible  asymmetry. They  assume that dis- 
counting earnings with the nominal interest rate is always incorrect, but 
that is not true. My reading of Wall Street pundits is that they do their 
analyses throughout in nominal dollars. If sales and earnings projections 
are made in expected nominal dollars, the correct present value is ob- 
tained by using the nominal interest rate. In fact, given the way tax laws 
are written, it may make excellent sense to do it that way. It is only if 
Wall Street makes real earnings projections and discounts these by the 
nominal  interest rate that the wrong answer is derived. A third problem 
with the Modigliani-Cohn model is that it does not explain why q was 
43.  The association between disequilibrium  movements of average q and invest- 
ment that is described in the Tobin-Brainard  investment model should allow one to 
construct an adjusted market value that removes some disequilibrium  movements 
by using observed investment behavior. I  have begun to experiment along those 
lines. The fact that investment  has remained  fairly high in the late 1970s despite the 
depressed  level of q is a supporting  fact for the hypothesis  of this paper. By contrast, 
the rapid increase in market value in the mid-1960s was associated with an invest- 
ment boom from 1965 to 1969, which suggests there was some disequilibrium. 
44.  Franco Modigliani and Richard  A. Cohn, "Inflation,  Rational Valuation and 
the Market,"  Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 35 (March-April 1979),  pp. 24-44. Martin Neil Baily  39 
lower in the late 1940s, when nominal interest rates were less than three 
percent, than it is today.45 
It has also been argued that the stock market reveals irrationality be- 
cause it is so volatile. This is a view with which I partly agree. The usual 
reason given is that the price of  a representative share is much more 
variable than the present value of the ex post earnings. But recorded earn- 
ings tell only part of the story. If the hypothesis of this paper is correct, 
changes in parameters of technical change or obsolescence  can result in 
very large capital gains or losses to holding old capital, as is shown in 
the theoretical model above. Thus the returns to holding shares are much 
more uncertain than they look.  Nonetheless,  it is true that speculative 
swings do affect market values at times. There was a speculative boom in 
stocks in the mid-1960s  without a corresponding increase in capital ser- 
vices, and the market was probably overly depressed in the mid- and late 
1970s. 
It is important to keep the correct perspective on market rationality. 
There are plenty of foolish people buying and selling stocks or even buy- 
ing and selling information about stocks. And certainly, ex post, one will 
be able to find many stocks that were undervalued or overvalued. Indeed, 
one can look back and find periods when stocks as a whole were under- or 
overvalued. It is also true that some corporate accounting practices are 
puzzling or irrational. But if  the  efficient markets hypothesis has  any 
application in  economics  it is  surely to  stock  and bond  markets. The 
standard estimates of the value of corporate capital are part .of the set of 
information readily available to  the market, as  are data on  all major 
industries and most of the large firms within these industries. The basic 
presumption of economic  analysis should surely be that clear and per- 
sistent trends in variables have a rationale. 
The possibilities for arbitrage by corporate insiders provide an impor- 
tant force drawing together the prices of old and new capital. First, cor- 
porate officers are generally major stockholders. If they know that the 
value of their own company's stock has gotten far out of line with their 
own estimate of the worth of the capital, they can profit from this infor- 
mation. But more important, they can take advantage of the active mar- 
ket in old capital. Rather than buying new capital goods, managers can 
45. The aftermath  of the Great Depression and World War II, however, makes it 
plausible that the capital stock was obsolete in the 1940s-an  explanation in line 
with the model given here. 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
buy other companies, buy or sell subsidiaries, or buy or sell particular 
plants. These transactions happen with some frequency. 
PUTTY-CLAY  CAPITAL 
The theoretical model above assumes technological embodiment but 
allows ex post capital-labor substitutability. It was shown that an exact 
relation exists in that model between the market value of the capital stock 
and the effective flow of capital services. Without the simple and tractable 
features of the putty-putty model, the link between V and effective capital 
services is altered, but not broken. 
A putty-clay model represents the other extreme in substitutability by 
assuming that once capital is in place it can only be put to use with a 
fixed relation between capital-hours and labor-hours. It  should be  as- 
sumed that, even in a putty-clay model, the utilization rate can vary. 
For example, if a plant with these characteristics is in place and operat- 
ing and there is an increase in the price of energy, in the short run there is 
no change made in production method and hence no change in capital 
services. The price of the product is simply raised to cover the increased 
fuel costs. Over time two things may happen. The capital may be retro- 
fitted to improve energy efficiency; alternatively, the capital may remain 
unaltered but as new, more fuel-efficient capital becomes available, com- 
petition begins to drive down the price of the product relative to the oper- 
ating costs of the old plant. This implies that the stream of quasi-rents 
from the old plant declines more rapidly as a result of the energy price 
change. 
Such a drop in quasi-rents remains closely linked to a decrease in capi- 
tal services even in  a putty-clay context; it must be  associated with a 
decline in the average utilization rate, with more rapid scrapping of the 
plant, or both. Introducing extra shifts involves  a wage penalty and a 
productivity penalty. After the energy price rise, the point at which add- 
ing shifts becomes unprofitable is reached more quickly in the lifetime 
of  the  capital. The  capital is  scrapped sooner  because  the  quasi-rent 
reaches zero sooner. 
The implications of this process are as follows. The perfect foresight 
market value of the plant falls quickly following the energy price rise as the 
future drop in quasi-rents is anticipated; but now the reduction in capital 
services follows behind the decline in market value. Thus the putty-clay Martin Neil  Baily  41 
differs from the putty-putty model in a predictable way: an adjustment lag 
is introduced between market value and capital services.46 
Empirical Application of Market Value 
The  conclusion  of  the preceding sections  is  that real market value 
should contain valuable information about the flow of  capital services. 
To  implement this idea in  analyzing productivity, I  have  adopted the 
series constructed by Daniel  Holland  and Stewart Myers for average q 
in  manufacturing and  nonfinancial  corporations  during the  1948-78 
period.47  Their q estimates are used to form indexes of capital input. As 
the preceding discussion shows, there are many reasons to be cautious 
about using real market value  exclusively  to measure capital services. 
Therefore, each index of capital input is a weighted geometric average of 
real market value and the conventional series for the stock of equipment 
and structures. In this combined capital index two-thirds of the weight 
comes from capital stock and one-third from real market value.48 
A  computation  of  total  factor  productivity growth was  then  made 
using the following relation: 
(27)  Aln  Q =  aAlnL+(1-a)AlnCK+E, 
where 
Q =  output 
L =  labor input 
CK  =  the combined capital index measuring capital input 
a  =  labor's share of income 
e  =  the estimate of the rate of growth of total factor productivity. 
46.  Actual market value may or may not lead to changes in capital services. In- 
vestors may rely on current quasi-rents  if they are not able to foresee the future 
pattern  of returns exactly. 
47.  Daniel M. Holland and Stewart C. Myers, "Profitability  and Capital Costs 
for  Manufacturing Corporations and All  Nonfinancial Corporations,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol.  70  (May  1980,  Papers  and Proceedings,  1979),  pp.  320-25. 
48. I have also formed a capital index using the q series for nonfinancial  corpo- 
rations  by George von Furstenberg  and by Jeremy Bulow and John Shoven. And I 
have used a broader  definition  of capital (all tangible assets) to combine with market 
value in forming the capital index. The results were similar to those discussed in the 
present  text. See George M. von Furstenberg,  "Corporate  Investment: Does Market 
Valuation Matter in the Aggregate," BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 347-97;  and Jeremy I. 
Bulow and John B. Shoven, "Inflation,  Corporate  Profits, and the Rate of Return to 
Capital,"  Conference Paper 107 (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 
1981). 42  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 6.  Effect of Capital Measure on Growth Rates of Capital and of Total Factor 
Productivity, Selected Sectors and Periods, 1948-78 
Percent 
Capital measure  Total factor productivity 
Equipment  Combined  Using equipment  Usinlg 
Sector and year  and structures  capital index  and structures  capital index 
Nonfinancial  corporations 
1948-68  3.88  4.64  2.14  1.93 
1968-73  4.16  3.11  1.76  2.04 
1973-78  3.14  0.01  0.81  1.66 
Nonfarm  business 
1948-68  4.25  5.00  1.70  1.45 
1968-73  4.40  3.20  1.09  1.49 
1973-78  2.94  0.32  0.72  1.77 
Manufacturing 
1948-73  3.06  3.57  2.27  2.10 
1973-78  3.70  0.95  0.65  1.98 
Sources: The data for equipment and structures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; the com- 
bined capital index and the total factor productivity are calculated by the author based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and from Daniel 
M. Holland and Stewart C. Myers, "Profitability  and Capital Costs for Manufacturing Corporations and 
All  Nonfinancial  Corporations,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  70  (May  1980,  Papers  and Proceedings, 
1979), pp. 320-25. 
The  findings for  nonfinancial corporations,  nonfarm business,  and 
manufacturing are shown in table 6.  The  results for nonfinancial cor- 
porations give support to the hypothesis that trends in market value are 
indicative of trends in capital services. The slowdown in total factor pro- 
ductivity is greatly reduced using the combined capital index. 
The market value of capital in the nonfarm business sector was esti- 
mated by applying the q series for nonfinancial corporations to the capital 
stock series for nonfarm business. Then a combined capital index was 
formed as before.  The table indicates that the combined capital index 
"overexplains" the slowdown because it suggests that the growth of total 
factor productivity accelerated in 1973-78. 
The productivity slowdown began in manufacturing after 1973, so the 
table shows periods before and after that year for this sector. The results 
indicate little slowdown in the growth of total factor productivity in the 
calculation using the capital index. 
I also made estimates for the production function using the combined 
capital index for the three sectors. For nonfinancial corporations, the re- Martin Neil Baily  43 
sults were 
(28) 
A In Q =  0.0200  +  0.767A In L +  0.233A In CK -  0.0107ALU 
(9.7)  (13.0)  (4.0)  (-4.4) 
R=  0.924  p=  -0.52; 
for nonfarm business, 
A In Q =  0.0191  +  0.812A In L +  0. 188A  In CK -  0.0085ALU 
(11.7)  (20.2)  (4.7)  (-5.0) 
RI =  0.928  p  =  -0.44; 
and for manufacturing, 
A In Q =  0.0240  +  0.843A  In  L  +  0.157A  In CK-  0.0314ALAYOFF 
(5.7)  (27.2)  (5.1)  (-6.6) 
R2 =  0.958  p  =  0.47. 
A cyclical adjustment  variable (with mean adjusted to zero) was included 
in all equations-the  change in the Perry-leading unemployment rate for 
the nonfinancial corporations and nonfarm business and the change in the 
layoff rate for manufacturing. The equations shown were constrained to 
give constant returns to scale.49  Given how hard it is to obtain good re- 
sults with a production function, these findings are acceptable. The capi- 
tal share is a bit low, but the estimates of total factor productivity growth 
are in line with the previous estimates. 
Some difficulties were encountered in the empirical application, how- 
ever. One is that in manufacturing the  1968-73  period showed  rapid 
growth of total factor productivity, no matter how it was calculated. This 
is  caused by the growth in  1971-72  and  1972-73.  These  were  years 
greatly altered by the  1980  data revision, and probably were years in 
which the true price index was very uncertain. The 1971-73  period was 
also one of very strong demand in manufacturing, so part of the strong 
49.  For nonfinancial corporations and manufacturing  this constraint is not re- 
jected by the data when it is removed. For the nonfarm business sector the uncon- 
strained  data show diminishing  returns  to scale. The expected signs and significance 
of the coefficients  remain when the constraint  is removed in all cases. Because of the 
constraint,  the t-statistics  on Aln L and Aln CK are not independent.  For example, 
in the equation  for nonfinancial  corporations  the t-statistic 13.0 is for the hypothesis 
a >  0. The t-statistic  4.0 is for the hypothesis  a < 1, where a is the parameter  describ- 
ing labor's  share. 44  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1  981 
productivity growth may be simply cyclical. But there is a puzzle here. 
A second and perhaps related difficulty may arise because the speculative 
boom in the stock market brought an escalation of real market value in 
the  mid-1960s  in  both  manufacturing corporations  and  nonfinancial 
corporations as a whole. If there were a way to smooth that boom that 
was not simply arbitrary  manipulation of the data, market value could be 
used to track post-1948 productivity trends very closely. 
These  difficulties notwithstanding, the  empirical  application  of  the 
model gives results consistent with the capital services explanation of the 
recent slowdown of productivity growth. 
Productivity at the Sectoral Level 
When evaluating hypotheses about the productivity growth slowdown 
it is natural to ask how they pertain to the various sectors; but there are 
serious problems of measurement and interpretation in doing this. First, 
information about the allocation of resources to one sector or another is 
imperfect and may get worse over time as firms merge and new firms 
form. Edward Denison has consistently argued that it is better to measure 
output and productivity at the level of nonfinancial corporations or the 
business sector than at a more disaggregated level such as manufacturing 
because  of  the  severe problems in  allocating  real value-added  among 
sectors. 
Second,  even  if  the  available data on  sectoral productivity are ac- 
cepted, there are conceptual problems in relating them to the aggregates. 
Suppose an industry is faced with a sudden increase in foreign competi- 
tion and half of the domestic plants are closed down and the capital goods 
scrapped. If only the most efficient plants remain, labor productivity in 
this industry could well increase. For the economy as a whole, however, 
the effective capital stock has been  reduced. If  a U.S.  industry reacts 
differently to the increase in foreign competition, the story may be dif- 
ferent. If it responds to the fall in demand for its domestically produced 
product as it does to a business cycle downturn, it may experience at least 
a  temporary downturn in  labor  productivity.50 At  the  sectoral  level, 
50. The difficulty  of interpretation  is highlighted by cross-country  comparisons. 
Data  from the  Organisation for  Economic Co-operation and Development that 
compare two-digit manufacturing  sectors for four major countries reveal virtually Martin Neil Baily  45 
moreover, rates of  technical change will be  more variable than in the 
aggregate. If some industry has done well in the 1970s even though it is 
energy-intensive, it presumably would have done even better without the 
energy crisis.51 
Despite  these  potential  pitfalls,  some  observations  from  individual 
industries and  sectoral  shifts  do  fit with  the  modeling  in  this  paper. 
As mentioned earlier, employment has shifted from the industrial sec- 
tor to services and wholesale and retail trade. Presumably the industrial 
sector, and manufacturing in particular, has been affected by energy, for- 
eign trade, and perhaps other structural changes. The resulting decline 
in capital services has slowed employment growth within the industrial 
sector and overall growth of real wages in the economy. This has encour- 
aged all sectors to use more labor-intensive techniques of production. In 
1968 services and wholesale and retail trade accounted for 44 percent of 
total private employment. But between 1968 and 1979, 70 percent of the 
total increase in private sector employment occurred in these three areas. 
In terms of the model in this paper, these employment shifts may be seen 
as an important consequence of the economy-wide decline in capital ser- 
vices. The decline in productivity in construction may also have resulted 
in part from the effect of employment mix. This industry once employed 
largely high-skilled union workers; now it is predominantly nonunion, and 
its members are relatively unskilled laborers.52 
The electricity-generating industry is highly capital intensive and has 
been greatly affected by the rise in the price of  energy-resulting  in a 
substantial decline in the flow of capital services relative to the available 
capital stock. A drop in the overall utilization rate of the capital, rather 
no correlation in industry productivity behavior. See OECD, Economic Outlook, 
July 1979 (Paris: OECD, 1979), p. 35. This is despite the fact that all the countries 
experienced  a slowdown. The energy crisis, shifting trade patterns,  and regulation all 
were felt in these countries, but their impact varied greatly depending  on particular 
economic conditions and the responses  of the firms in the different  countries. These 
data need further investigation. But at the very least, they caution against simply 
looking at different sectors to decide whether energy or some other explanation of 
the slowdown is correct. 
51. It is also important  to realize that there is no monotonic relation in the cross 
section between productivity  growth and average q. In fact, sectors with high rates 
of embodied technical change will have persistently low q because the old capital 
becomes  obsolete so quickly;  the electronics industries  are an example. 
52. Julian E. Lange and Daniel Quinn Mills, The Construction Industry (Lex- 
ington  Books, 1979). 46  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
than shifts across vintages or increased scrapping, has been the principal 
cause of the decline in services, although some obsolete plants have been 
retired. The experience of the industry has been described by Andrew 
Carron and Paul MacAvoy.53 Annual output growth for electric utilities 
averaged 7.1 percent in 1965-69,  6.3 percent in 1969-73  and -0.3  per- 
cent in  1973-77.54  This decline in output growth was paralleled by  a 
slowdown in productivity growth. Labor productivity rose by 4.9  per- 
cent a year in  1965-69,  3.9  percent a year in  1969-73,  and stopped 
growing after 1973.  Carron and MacAvoy  argue:  "One cause  of  this 
reduction in productivity was the lower rate of  utilization of  capacity, 
particularly new capacity, consequent from the economy-wide slowdown 
of demand growth. The capital-intensive regulated industries, which plan 
investment far in advance.  . . , were not able to adjust rapidly to a lower 
level of final demand growth." 
The capability margin for utilities provides a measure of utilization. 
This is  the margin of  reserve generating capacity relative to  the peak 
demand period during the year. This margin was 31.0  percent in 1961. 
It fell to 22.9  percent in  1965  and to  16.6 percent by  1969.  These in- 
creases of demand relative to capacity were important factors in the rapid 
growth of labor productivity. In 1969 there were "brownouts" and other 
signs of capacity shortage, and the margin was increased to 20.8 percent 
by 1973. By 1979 this margin was 36.1 percent or almost 20 percentage 
points above its 1969 low point, which represents a very substantial drop 
in capital services relative to the stock. 
Productivity is affected by the utilization of the transmission and dis- 
tribution system as well  as by the utilization of  generating capacity.55 
Productivity gains in this sector have been achieved, in part, almost auto- 
matically as the demand for electricity per household or per establishment 
has risen. This increase has allowed more output to be pumped through 
a given distribution network. Once demand per household or establish- 
ment starts to decline, as it did after 1973, so does productivity from this 
source. 
53.  Andrew  S. Carron  and Paul  W.  MacAvoy,  The Decline  of  Service  in Regu- 
lated Industries (American Enterprise  Institute, 1981).  All data in this section on 
electric utilities are taken from this source. 
54. Ibid., p. 40. 
55. This point has been made by Thurow  in "The  Productivity  Problem." Martin Neil Baily  47 
The airline industry has also been greatly affected by the rise in the 
price of  energy. In this industry the vintage capital framework, retro- 
fitting, and scrapping are all important. Economic  obsolescence  deter- 
mines when planes are retired. According to a recent newspaper article, 
"Ordinarily  you shouldn't have to replace a plane . ..  aircraft don't wear 
out....  If a part shows signs of stress you merely replace it....  The real 
issues are . ..  route changes . .  . [that] can alter the kind of fleet a carrier 
will need. Soaring fuel prices [that] have made gas guzzling 707's  and 
DC  8's uneconomical. And  new smoke-and-noise-abatement standards 
[that] are threatening to make some planes obsolete."56 
Because  of  this obsolescence  old  planes  are being retired. Another 
newspaper stated "Airlines such as Trans World, Pan Am and American 
are . . . retiring their fleets at a rate of some 20 jets a year."57  The Civil 
Aeronautics Board reports that 312 "old large" aircraft were retired from 
use in the  1970-79  period, leaving only  184 in service in  1979.58  The 
market value of these obsolete planes is low indeed. Following the 1979 
energy price increase, many old  aircraft are being modified. The  same 
newspaper reported "Owners of the super-60 series of the DC8  . . .  are 
sending them in for 'retrofitting,' a process of installing efficient, quieter 
engines at a cost of about $15 million a plane."59  Other planes, such as 
the Boeing 727, are also being retrofitted. 
Although  the  airline industry is  a  classic  example  of  the  process 
modeled in this paper, labor productivity growth has been affected by a 
variety of factors of which the retirement of capital is only one. The an- 
nual increase in labor productivity averaged 7.0 percent in 1954-68,  4.6 
percent in 1968-73,  and 4.9 percent in  1973-78.6o  Without capital ob- 
solescence,  one would have expected rapid productivity growth in this 
industry  in the late 1970s. In this period the deregulation of airlines raised 
56. Art Pine, "Aircraft Resale:  Previously Owned 747-For  You  a  Special 
Deal,"  The  Washington  Post,  March  22,  1981. 
57. Bruce Hager, "New Life for Old Jets in Engine Jobs," New  York Times, 
April 19, 1981. 
58. These figures, from various issues of the Civil Aeronautics Board's Aircraft 
Operating  Cost  and Performance  Report,  were  called  to  my  attention  by  Robert  J. 
Gordon. 
59.  New  York Times, April  19, 1981. 
60. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  Productivity  Indexes,  p. 169. 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
load factors,6' favored the more efficient carriers, and reduced the offer- 
ing of additional service as a means of competing for passengers. 
The mining sector of the economy has experienced a sharp decline in 
productivity because the natural resource base in oil  and gas has been 
declining and the rise in the price of  energy has induced a substantial 
increase in the amount of capital and labor applied to this diminishing 
resource base.62  The slowdown in productivity in mining, therefore, is not 
a great mystery. If the available natural resource base is viewed as a capi- 
tal good  whose  services have  been  diminishing, productivity develop- 
ments in this industry do fit the model. 
This brief review of a few sectors represents only a sketch of work that 
would be necessary to determine the importance of the decline in capital 
services and of  energy, foreign trade, regulation, and product market 
shifts in explaining sectoral productivity behavior. Special developments 
abound, and these will not fit neatly into any simple model. Nonetheless, 
it appears that some sectors do reveal the kinds of behavior modeled here. 
Conclusions  and Implications  for Investment 
This paper argues that the slowdown in labor productivity growth that 
has occurred since 1968 and particularly since 1973 has probably been 
caused by a decline in the services of capital and labor relative to the 
measured quantities of these inputs. There is enough suggestive evidence 
of a decrease in effective labor input relative to measured labor hours to 
attribute about one-seventh  of  the productivity growth decline  to  this 
source. These effects have been concentrated outside the main manufac- 
turing and industrial sectors. 
The most important cause of  the growth slowdown  in recent years 
seems to be a decline in the services of capital, caused by obsolescence 
and by the diversion of some part of capital spending to saving energy or 
product conversion. The drop in the market value of capital, shown by 
61.  Between 1973 and 1979 the average load factor increased 20 percent, and 
seating density increased  7 percent according  to Carron  and MacAvoy, "The Decline 
of Service,"  p. 61. 
62.  See William D.  Nordhaus, "Oil and Economic Performance in Industrial 
Countries,"  BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 341-88,  for a discussion of this sector. Labor rela- 
tions difficulties  have plagued coal mining, and the mine safety act has also been 
important.  But oil and gas dominate the overall mining series. Martin Neil Baily  49 
the  decline in  Tobin's  q,  provides  a  signal that  capital  services have 
decreased.  Obsolescence  reduces  profit net  of  economic  depreciation 
sharply, a development that should show up in a reduced q, while gross 
profit remains strong. It is possible that the decline in q has not signaled 
a decline in capital services, but rather has come about from other, un- 
known causes. But there have been three major puzzles in the 1970s. Why 
has q fallen? Why has investment remained strong given the low q? Why 
has productivity declined? A decline in capital services links these puzzles 
together and makes them all easier to understand. It would be a remark- 
able coincidence if, in fact, they are independent with unrelated explana- 
tions. 
A decline in capital services relative to the capital stock of 2 percent a 
year in 1968-78  is sufficient to explain the productivity slowdown. This 
paper argues that structural  change in the economy, in part in response to 
higher energy prices, has been the underlying cause of the increased rate 
of capital obsolescence. During the 1950s and 1960s the index of capital 
services  developed  here  rose  relative  to  the  measured  capital  stock, 
probably because the economy emerged from World War II with a capital 
stock that needed to be rebuilt. According to the model in this paper, this 
means conventional estimates based on the measured capital stock over- 
stated the rate of total factor productivity growth through the mid-1960s, 
and the steady-state productivity growth rate of the U.S. economy is lower 
than has been thought. Thus some part of the recent productivity slow- 
down is simply a return to the long-run steady-state path. 
An implication of this paper is that investment may do more to im- 
prove productivity growth than  a  conventional  analysis predicts. The 
basic  arithmetic of  growth analysis suggests that adding  1 percentage 
point to the growth rate of the capital stock adds 0.25 percentage point to 
the growth rate of output and productivity. In this model, however, the 
amount of additional investment that would add 1 point to the growth 
rate of the capital stock is enough to add K/V  points to capital services.63 
If the ratio of capital services to capital stock were 0.6,  K/V  would be 
1.67, so adding 1 percentage point to the growth rate of the capital stock 
would add 0.42 point to output and productivity growth.64 
63. This is because the measure of capital services, V, has a growth rate depend- 
ing upon I/V,  whereas the capital stock, K, has a growth rate depending  upon I/K. 
64. Actual market value would correctly measure capital services if the equi- 
librium  value of Tobin's average q were equal to 0.6. 50  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
There is an important qualification to this conclusion. If major struc- 
tural changes are expected to continue into the 1980s and no one is cer- 
tain what they will be,  making large-scale  capital commitments today 
becomes risky. The decline in capital services in the  1970s  came about 
because of a high rate of economic  depreciation. We will gain little by 
adding substantially to the growth rate of gross output if we add little 
to output net of economic depreciation. The payoff to investment will be 
exceptionally large provided that new capital can avoid the problem of 
obsolescence that slowed productivity during the past decade. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Robert J. Gordon:  Martin Baily's analysis of the U.S. productivity growth 
slowdown is important and original. Unlike the studies of Denison  and 
others, it concludes that the slowdown can be explained within the frame- 
work of conventional economic  analysis and does not have to be rele- 
gated to the status of an unsolved mystery. Unlike the papers by Rasche 
and Tatom, it proposes a channel by which higher energy prices could 
have explained much of the puzzle, rather than simply resting its case on 
an observed time-series correlation between energy prices and produc- 
tivity behavior.' 
In Baily's analysis, energy prices are a major, but not the only, source 
of a reduction in capital services that explains the productivity slowdown. 
If his capital effectiveness hypothesis is accepted, Baily's paper will have 
wide-ranging implications for economic  forecasting and policy.  Among 
these are that the productivity growth slowdown is temporary, that pro- 
ductivity growth will eventually resume in the absence of future oil shocks, 
and that incentives for saving and investment are warranted to stimulate 
the replacement of prematurely obsolete  old capital by new capital de- 
signed for the new processes  and products appropriate in  a regime of 
higher energy prices. 
A  novice  detective  newly  assigned  to  investigate  the  productivity 
mystery would be immediately impressed by the trail of circumstantial 
evidence leading to energy prices as the prime suspect-most  of the slow- 
1. Robert A. Rasche and John A. Tatom, "Energy  Price Shocks, Aggregate Sup- 
ply, and Monetary Policy: The Theory and the International Evidence," in Karl 
Brunner and Allen  H. Metzler,  eds., Supply Shocks,  Incentives,  and National  Wealth, 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on  Public  Policy,  vol.  14  (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland,  1981), pp. 9-93. 
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down occurred after the initial 1973 OPEC shock; an even more ominous 
absolute decline in the level of U.S. productivity has occurred in the wake 
of the  1979-80  OPEC shock; and productivity growth simultaneously 
fell in most industrial countries after 1973, just when these countries were 
exposed  to  the  common  influence  of  higher oil  prices.  However,  the 
novice detective is likely to find, upon announcement that he has a prime 
suspect, that the older detectives on the force yawn with boredom and 
tell him to look elsewhere with "Don't you know that the 5 percent share 
of energy usage in GNP, multiplied by the 2 percentage point slowdown 
in the growth of the energy-to-GNP ratio, can only explain 0.1 point of 
the total 2.0  point productivity slowdown? This leaves  1.9 points to be 
explained by other suspects." Slightly discouraged, the novice  asks his 
senior colleagues whom they have found as a prime suspect and is sur- 
prised to find that their response consists only of prolonged silence. 
Baily's paper can be viewed as an outgrowth of the earlier hypothesis 
of Berndt-Wood and Hudson-Jorgenson that, because capital and energy 
are complements, higher energy prices should cause a substitution from 
capital to labor. Opponents of  this hypothesis have pointed to the in- 
ability of the observed behavior of the capital stock data to explain much 
of the productivity slowdown when fed through the conventional arith- 
metic of growth accounting. But, as Baily points out, official data on the 
capital stock are created by the perpetual inventory method with fixed 
retirement and depreciation patterns. By design, these data are incapable 
of capturing the effects of higher energy prices in both raising the rate of 
obsolescence  and premature retirement and in causing lower utilization 
rates. Because output is produced by capital services, not a mechanically 
measured capital stock, it is plausible that the growth rate of capital ser- 
vices has declined by enough to explain most or all of the productivity 
slowdown. 
This idea has been suggested before  (for example, when Rasche and 
Tatom refer to premature capital retirement as an explanation of their 
enormous coefficients on the relative price of energy in productivity equa- 
tions),  but Baily's paper contains several original ideas, which, at least 
as far as I know, have not previously been fully developed or tied to- 
gether. First, the energy price impact can show up not just in premature 
scrappage, but may primarily take the form of reduced utilization. Sec- 
ond, premature obsolescence  not only changes the ratio of effective to 
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profits, since depreciation deductions are understated when economic life- 
times suddenly shrink. This disguised decline in profitability, in turn, may 
have been recognized by efficient financial markets and may constitute a 
more satisfactory explanation of the low level of stock market prices in 
the past decade than the alternative hypothesis of investor irrationality. 
Baily's demonstration that the efficient-markets valuation of a firm mir- 
rors effective capital input in a vintage model seems convincing given his 
assumptions, and the correlation between market value and effective capi- 
tal should survive in a more general dynamic model, as he suggests in his 
discussion of putty-clay. 
But proposing the effective capital hypothesis is not the same as pro- 
viding  a  convincing  empirical validation.  Baily's  evidence  in  table  6 
amounts to little more than a restatement that the stock market and pro- 
ductivity puzzles occurred simultaneously. The slowdown in productivity 
growth can be "explained" when a conventional index of capital input is 
replaced by  one  that  consists  of  a two-thirds weight  on  conventional 
capital and one-third on an index of stock market value. To go beyond 
this, and to convince skeptics, Baily or his future disciples will have to 
measure effective capital directly and produce numbers that are consistent 
with table 6, which implies that the ratio of effective to measured capital 
fell cumulatively by almost 20 percent between 1968 and 1978, as shown 
below. 
1948  1968  1973  1978 
Equipment  and structures 
(1948=  100)  100.0  217.3  267.5  313.0 
Combined  capital  index 
(1948  =  100)  100.0  252.9  295.4  295.4 
Ratio of combined  capital 
index to equipment  and 
structures  1.000  1.164  1.104  0.944 
This estimate of a 20  percent required drop in the ratio of effective to 
actual  capital  corresponds fairly  closely  to  an  estimate I  made  from 
Rasche and Tatom's energy price coefficients that premature retirement 
of  28  percent of  the U.S.  capital stock would have been  necessary to 
rationalize their results.2 
2.  Robert J. Gordon, "Comment on  R. Rasche and J. Tatom, 'Energy Price 
Shocks, Aggregate Supply, and Monetary Policy: The Theory and the International 
Evidence,'  in Brunner  and Metzler,  eds., Supply  Shocks, p. 98. 54  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Is there any evidence available to support Baily's conjectures? His own 
disaggregations make this look  difficult. Baily's table 2  shows that the 
slowdown in the nonfarm nonmanufacturing sector between the 1957-68 
and  1973-79  periods was almost  double  the  size  of  the  slowdown  in 
manufacturing, and over half of  that slowdown  occurred before  1973. 
These figures exacerbate the task of  proving Baily's  hypothesis-first, 
because data limitations and conceptual difficulties prevent the construc- 
tion of a capital utilization series for most sectors within nonfarm non- 
manufacturing and, second, because the large fraction of the slowdown 
in the productivity of that sector before  1973 casts suspicion on energy 
prices as the prime suspect. Yet, to convince skeptics, Baily must some- 
how show that effective capital utilization has declined in those parts of the 
economy in which measuring utilization is difficult, if not impossible. 
Baily's model with heterogeneous capital requires that the events of 
the 1970s appear as a decline in the utilization of old plants and machines 
relative to new ones. Yet my own preliminary investigation of two indus- 
tries that Baily cites as favorable to his hypothesis-electric  generating 
plants and airlines-does  not produce the required pattern of utilization 
changes. The electric utility industry provides a classic case study of  a 
slowdown in productivity growth, with steady deceleration of productivity 
improvement in the period between  1948  and 1973,  followed  by a dis- 
appearance of productivity growth altogether after 1973. 
A  niore precisely focused view of the electric generating industry is 
provided in table 1, which exhibits data on utilization rates and produc- 
tivity for a large sample of nonnuclear generating plants. The  average 
rates of productivity growth for all plants over the five intervals in the 
table are, respectively, 8.01,  8.66,  6.59,  1.35,  and 1.31 percent a year, 
indicating a drastic slowdown in growth that preceded the  1973  OPEC 
oil shock. It is clear that Baily's model provides little help in explaining 
this phenomenon. The utilization rate for all plants dropped only from 
51.5 to 49.2 percent between 1958-59  and 1977. A more interesting re- 
sult appears in the ratio of the utilization rate of new plants to that of all 
plants, which shows a decline from 126 to 77 percent over the same inter- 
val. I do not have a full explanation for this phenomenon, but it is neither 
consistent with nor explained by Baily's vintage model. Two factors may 
have been at work-the  increasing size of plants, which allowed operating 
economies, ceased in the mid-1960s,  and environmental legislation may 
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Table 1. Utilization  Rates and  Productivity  for a Sample  of Nonnuclear  Electric 
Generating  Plants,  Selected  Periods,  1948-77a 
Item  1948-49  1958-59  1963-64  1968-69  1971-72  1977 
Utilization  rate (percent) 
New plants  61.8  64.9  60.3  52.5  47.3  38.1 
All plants  60.7  51.5  52.8  56.5  56.5  49.2 
Ratio of new to all 
plants  1.02  1.26  1.14  0.93  0.84  0.77 
Output  per employee 
(million  kilowatt- 
hours  per  employee) 
New  plants  8.95  19.77  31.43  33.99  35.86  24.63b 
All plants  5.54  11.97  18.13  24.96  25.98  27.91 
Source: Data for  1948-72 were provided by T.  G.  Cowing of  the Economic Growth Institute, State 
University of New York at Binghamton, based on a sample of plant data reported in Energy Information 
Administration,  Steam-Electric  Plant  Constructioni  Cost  and  Anniiual Production  Expenses,  various  issues. 
New plant data for 1971-72 and all data in 1977 are from a sample recorded in Steam Electric Plant Conz- 
struction  Cost  and  Annual  Production  Expenses,  1971,  1972,  1976,  1977,  with  plants  chosen  for  the  same 
firms as in the 1948-72 sample. 
a.  New plant data are reported for the first full year of operation in each period. 
b. New plant data are based on an average of 1976 and 1977 observations to increase the sample size. 
legislation should apply equally to  all plants).  Overall, Nordhaus' hy- 
pothesis of an exogenous and unexplained reduction in the rate of tech- 
nical improvement is likely to come out ahead in explaining the electric 
utility growth slowdown.3 
In the airline industry, which has perhaps been more severely affected 
by higher energy prices than any other, there is no evidence of the mecha- 
nism that Baily proposes. First, there was no slowdown in productivity 
growth after the first 1973  oil shock. The annual growth of output per 
man-hour in the industry was, in Baily's paper, 4.6 percent a year between 
1968 and 1973, and 4.9 percent a year between 1973 and 1979. The air- 
lines appear to have reacted to the financial squeeze of higher oil prices 
to  move  closer  to  an  "efficiency frontier"-unprofitable  routes  were 
dropped, more and narrower seats were added to wide-body aircraft, and 
the percentage of seats occupied was raised. 
Was there a shift toward premature retirement and lower utilization of 
older units of capital in the case of airlines? Table 2 provides information 
on three general types of jet aircraft, a "new large" category (747,  DC10, 
3. William D. Nordhaus, "Policy Responses to the Productivity Slowdown," in 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston,  The  Decline  in Productivity  Growth,  Conference 
Series 22 (FRBB, 1980), pp. 147-72. 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1 981 
Table 2. Characteristics  of Domestic  Trunk  Airline  Operations,  1970-79 
Number  of aircraft  in service  Utilization  (hours  per day) 
New  Old  New  Old 
Year  large  large  Small  large  large  Small 
1970  13  496  892  8.5  8.4  6.8 
1971  45  462  906  8.9  8.1  6.9 
1972  88  422  896  8.5  8.0  6.9 
1973  137  366  894  8.8  7.8  7.3 
1974  178  288  928  7.8  7.6  6.9 
1975  200  277  932  7.7  7.2  6.9 
1976  222  259  975  7.7  7.2  7.1 
1977  222  239  1,006  8.2  7.4  7.3 
1978  222  202  1,040  8.4  7.7  7.5 
1979  206  184  1,054  8.9  8.1  8.1 
Sources:  U.S.  Civil  Aeronautics  Board,  Aircraft  Operating  Cost  and  Performance  Report,  July  1980 
and preceding issues. 
Ll011),  an "old large" category (707,  DC8),  and a "small" category 
(727,  737, DC9).  The major episode of retirement of old large aircraft 
came in 1972-74,  but this seems to be better explained by the production 
schedule  of  new large aircraft than by  the timing of  the  1973  OPEC 
shock. There seems to have been little change in utilization rates between 
1971  and  1979,  with old  planes  averaging about 0.6  hour  a  day less 
utilization. In fact, the major shift seems to have been an increase after 
1975  in the use of  small planes, most of  which had been built before 
1970. 
Some of the productivity slowdown in the nonfarm nonmanufacturing 
sector may be  an indirect consequence  of the slower growth in output 
since 1973.  Along the lines suggested by Baily, some of the newly built 
shopping centers of  the  1970s  may have been utilized much less  than 
expected, due both to slower growth in real consumption and also to the 
incentive of  higher energy prices to  compress the  dimensions of  each 
metropolitan area. The juxtaposition of the examples-the  electric gener- 
ating industry, the airline industry, and shopping centers-points  out an 
important qualification to Baily's theoretical analysis. A  vintage model 
with heterogeneous  capital is  sufficient but  not  necessary to  result in 
variations in the ratio of  effective to  conventionally  measured capital. 
Even  with homogeneous  capital, higher energy prices could  lead  to  a 
reduction in  utilization.  In  fact,  it  is  the  oldest  capital that has been Martin  Neil Baily  57 
"grounded"  in the airline case, but the newest capital in the electricity and 
shopping center examples. 
The ultimate verdict on Baily's hypothesis will depend on the outcome 
of careful exercises in the measurement of capital services and of output 
itself. Baily's paper stresses the dislocation  to the automobile industry 
caused by the need to spend tens of billions of dollars retooling to pro- 
duce more energy-efficient output. The retooling effort involves prema- 
turely throwing out existing equipment and plant, thus causing conven- 
tional measures to overstate capital input. Perhaps as important is that 
the government has no procedures by which a shift in product develop- 
ment from large gas guzzlers to small, fuel-efficient automobiles can be 
properly treated by price indexes  like  the  consumer price index,  and 
hence by official output measures. In one  case study, I developed new 
price indexes for commercial aircraft that took full account of the value 
to users of improved operating efficiency. Primarily because of the intro- 
duction of jet aircraft, the estimated annual growth in output and produc- 
tivity was  increased sharply by this quality adjustment. Similar studies to 
quantify the user value of energy savings in the automobile, appliance, 
and  other  industries may  ultimately  explain  part  of  the  productivity 
puzzle. 
Another area of mismeasurement related to the productivity slowdown 
has occurred in an industry that has been relatively untouched by higher 
energy prices-electronics  and office equipment. It has long been official 
government policy to ignore the declining price of electronic computers 
and related equipment, and this has led to a growing understatement of 
output growth in this branch of manufacturing. Further, there may be a 
more subtle channel by which the electronic revolution has caused an 
understatement of output growth in the nonfarm nonmanufacturing sec- 
tor. A large part of the electronic equipment purchased by the financial 
sector has been designed to change the nature of  services available to 
consumers-for  example, twenty-four hour money machines and more 
detailed bank statements. Improved computers to arrange airline reser- 
vations and seat selection systems are in the same category. Because the 
improvements in the nature of output are not counted in the GNP  and 
productivity data, I suspect that a growing part of investment may have 
a marginal product that is officially measured to be zero but is socially 
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To conclude, I find Baily's basic idea persuasive, but suspect that it 
will be hard to validate directly. 
Robert M. Solow:  I am told that the early line in Las Vegas was three to 
one against Baily, or anyone else, coming up with something new to say 
about the productivity slowdown at this late date. If I were a betting man, 
I would have gone with the odds. As  usual, I would have been wrong. 
That is why I am not a betting man. Besides a number of intelligent side 
comments, Martin Baily's paper contains two interesting, original, and 
enlightening ideas, one of which comes out negative and the other posi- 
tive. I concentrate on them. 
First, however, I would like to make a cautionary remark about the 
very nature of the exercise. A productivity puzzle is said to exist when all 
the measurable causal factors that can be mustered are only able to ac- 
count for a fraction, say half, of the observed deceleration in labor pro- 
ductivity. The rest is left as an unexplained deceleration of the growth of 
the residual. To solve the productivity puzzle is to explain in some other 
way that remaining half of the deceleration. So the puzzle is completely 
solved when the claim can be made that the growth rate of the residual 
did not change in the 1970s after all. So far as I know, there is no reason 
to believe that the Divine Economist intended the residual to grow at a 
constant compound interest rate forever. If there were such a doctrine, 
there would surely already be lawsuits to require that it be taught in the 
schools. My impression is that the residual moves with some irregularity. 
Almost the only constant growth rate one could imagine for it is zero: a 
number growing like a pure exponential could hardly be called a residual, 
except for the limiting case that there is no residual. 
I do not mean to say that economists should stop whittling away at the 
residual, trying to reduce it, and trying to reduce dependence on varia- 
tions in its growth rate to explain changes in the productivity trend. Even 
if growth accounting is unlikely to be  so  Newtonian  as to  succeed  in 
eliminating residual growth entirely, the effort has to be made. But I am 
cynical enough about empirical economics to fear that if we continue at it 
long enough we will succeed in eliminating the residual, even if it is really 
there. The  enterprise calls  for  caution  and tentativeness and thought, 
more than number-pushing. That is one reason why I like what Baily has 
done. 
His first major contribution is to throw cold water on the comforting Martin Neil  Baily  59 
notion that they just do not make people the way they used to, the idea 
that recent additions to the labor force are somehow fundamentally less 
productive than people  of  the same age were in  earlier cohorts. Baily 
approaches this problem indirectly. Suppose there were a cohort-specific 
productivity factor,  and  suppose  it  evolved  smoothly  over  successive 
cohorts, like a fourth-degree polynomial to be specific. Baily calculates 
what that cohort-specific productivity pattern must be in order for it to 
give  a good  representation of  aggregate labor  quality when  all  active 
cohorts are added up with the appropriate empirical weights. The result 
is given in table 4 of the paper. Baily concludes,  and I agree, that the 
implied answer is implausible. It is really hard to believe  that the co- 
hort born in 1963  is intrinsically only about half as productive, on the 
average, as the cohort born in 1943. But that is what is implied if the drag 
from the relatively small number of young people is to explain the overall 
drop in labor quality. The hypothesis cannot carry the weight required 
of it. 
Baily goes on to discuss, in a fragmentary way, the related idea that 
there has been a general, not cohort-specific, decline in effort per hour 
nominally worked, or even that actual hours worked have fallen faster 
than reported hours worked. The time diaries he mentions do provide a 
snapshot of how workers actually spent their time at work but no evi- 
dence on changes in that behavior. I wish there were some way of check- 
ing the  casual  notion  that there has  been  a widespread expansion  of 
on-the-job leisure. Maybe a close study of collective bargaining contracts 
over a couple of decades would give a partial answer. That sort of change 
would have the merit of being a natural and even desirable aspect of rising 
standards of living. 
The second and more striking contribution of the paper is a serious 
reconsideration of the possibility that the measurement of  capital input 
by the net stock at reproduction cost may progressively overstate the flow 
of capital services in recent years. This part of the paper is both intellec- 
tually  and practically satisfying. It  is  neat;  and  there is  an  excellent 
chance that it is really telling us something about the world. 
Baily uses a very special model, but there is little doubt that the general 
idea would carry over to some more general settings. There are two kinds 
of systematic effects on productivity. One is the standard sort of vintage- 
specific neutral technological change. It should appropriately be thought 
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as  a  sort  of  "structural-change-induced obsolescence";  it  enters  like 
Hicks-neutral exponential technological decay related to the age of capital 
rather than its vintage. The story Baily has in mind is that events like the 
rapid rise in the relative price of  energy render some  items of  capital 
equipment unexpectedly unsuitable, or require costly retrofitting that can 
also be modeled as rapid obsolescence. Moreover, industries that produce 
energy-using items like automobiles or refrigerators may also find that 
their product has become unsuitable for the new price-configuration; and 
this too can be summarized loosely  as rapid obsolescence  of equipment 
in the automobile or appliance industry. Baily models this sort of event 
as a speedup in the rate of exponential technological decay. That seems 
a little strong to me. A once-and-for-all reduction in the level  of effective 
output produced by old capital would be more plausible and would prob- 
ably have  less  dramatic consequences.  Baily's  gambit might be  more 
plausible if it involved a temporary increase in the rate of obsolescence, 
followed by a return to the original rate, at a permanently lower level. 
That would leave him with the problem of deciding when the episode was 
over; it would also entail catch-up effects that have not yet been  seen. 
But perhaps they are still to come. 
This vintage model has the perfectly charming property that it admits 
an aggregate production function with neutral technological  change in 
which the appropriate, the technologically  appropriate, measure of  the 
flow of  capital services is the forward-looking perfect-foresight market 
value of the hodge-podge of capital stocks of different vintages. Because 
of the coexistence of different vintages, with different initial technological 
levels and different amounts of experienced obsolescence,  this forward- 
looking  market value differs from the reproduction cost of  the  capital 
stock, or rather from the amount of output that went into the production 
of the particular capital items now in existence. So Tobin's q has a natural 
niche in this model of production. 
A foreseen permanent increase in the rate of vintage-specific capital- 
augmenting technological progress causes q to fall-that  is, decreases the 
value of the stock of capital goods because it pulls labor away from older 
capital and diminishes its flow of quasi-rents. An increase in the rate of 
obsolescence lowers the value of the existing stock for obvious reasons. 
There is no way of separating those effects. But if the market value of the 
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easier to account for the productivity slowdown. Baily shows that when 
capital input is measured by real market value  there is  essentially no 
remaining deceleration of the residual to worry about. The productivity 
slowdown was caused by whatever caused q to fall. This is a gross over- 
statement, and Baily should perhaps be more cautious. The recorded fall 
in q may have many causes. Only to the extent that it reflects a foreseen 
drop in previously expected quasi-rents is it relevant to Baily's purpose. 
There is a second reason for questioning the direct applicability of this 
model to the years after 1973. When an adverse shock occurs, there is a 
simultaneous deceleration of productivity by virtue of the ad hoc obso- 
lescence  factor in  a putty-putty model.  If  there is  little or no  ex  post 
flexibility in the labor requirements for production on  already existing 
capital, as most of us casually believe, the timing must be rather different. 
When the price of oil rises, current and expected future quasi-rents fall. 
The anticipated retirement date of existing capital comes closer in time. 
For both reasons, market value falls instantaneously. The assumption of 
ex post fixed proportions means, however, that there is no change in re- 
corded productivity on old capital until it is retired. Only as gross invest- 
ment creates plants whose factor proportions reflect the substitution of 
labor for energy (and for complementary capital)  does the productivity 
curve decelerate. I do not think this lag can be aggregated away rigor- 
ously, but aggregation will certainly smooth the process. 
In my view, the Baily idea survives as a genuine insight into one source 
of the productivity slowdown, even if it cannot be translated literally from 
this rather special model into the real world. 
Baily's candidate for the ultimate cause is structural change, particu- 
larly those maladjustments set off by the rise in energy prices. I cannot 
say that is an unreasonable story. But neither can I say that it is com- 
pelling. Presumably every decade has its structural changes and surprises. 
One tends to  think that the oil  shock was bigger than most; but then 
everybody always thinks that "our" shock was bigger than most. I would 
look for some direct evidence that accelerated obsolescence was a much 
larger factor in the 1970s than in other periods. Baily does provide some 
figures showing  that  the  amplitude of  changes  in  relative  prices  was 
greater in the 1970s than in the two decades before. It is hard to know 
what constitutes a big difference in this matter. I was not swept off my 
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opened up a really interesting line of inquiry here; it is quite an achieve- 
ment. But it badly needs some independent verification, better systematic 
than anecdotal. 
One last point. Baily  does not really raise one  question that I have 
occasionally thought is promising. How about the hours of work of capi- 
tal, another component of the flow of services from a given stock? Murray 
Foss  has recently published some figures showing that plant hours per 
week rose by 25 percent between 1929 and 1976.1 That would suggest a 
possible underestimate of the growth of the flow of services. But Foss's 
figures relate only to the endpoints of the long period and tell nothing 
about shorter-run changes. He has some annual data for manufacturing 
for  1973-77;  they show  a sharp cyclical  reduction of  plant hours per 
week in the 1974 recession and then a recovery. But 1977 is still 5 per- 
cent lower than 1973. That may be too little to matter. 
Baily mentions that capital per full-time equivalent worker might be a 
better measure of capital intensity than capital per hour worked, but then 
makes no use of it. I think he should have. If weekly hours are propor- 
tional to the hours of a full-time worker, capital per hour will overstate 
capital intensity when the workweek is falling, whereas capital per full- 
time equivalent worker will represent it more accurately. But that is a 
dull point, and Baily's angle is fascinating. 
Martin Neil Baily:  I have some reservations about Robert Gordon's data 
on  electricity generation and  airlines. As  a general point,  the vintage 
model predicts less use of the most energy-inefficient capital, but this may 
not be the oldest. The declining utilization of new versus old generating 
plants shown in his table 1 is notable; but without further information, it 
is unexplained by any model, not just mine. It is impressive, and consistent 
with my model, that labor productivity of the new plants fell abruptly after 
the energy price increase. Gordon's data on the retirement of "old large" 
aircraft during the 1970s are consistent with the hypothesis of the paper, 
while his interesting information on  utilization fails  to  recognize that, 
within his categories, the mix of aircraft has changed over time. The same 
source he cites in the table reveals, for example, that the DC8-50  was 
utilized  7.05  hours a day in  1979  compared with  8.48  hours for  the 
more modern DC8-61  and 8.88 hours for the DC8-62.  The DC8-10  and 
1.  Murray  F.  Foss,  Changes  in the  Workweek  of  Fixed  Capital:  U.S.  Manufac- 
turing, 1929 to 1976 (American Enterprise  Institute, 1981), pp. 2, 8. Martin Neil Baily  63 
DC8-30  were the really inefficient versions, but they were phased out 
completely by 1979. Similar patterns are shown for the different versions 
of the 707 and the DC9. 
General Discussion 
Baily's hypothesis that declining capital services had contributed to 
the productivity slowdown seemed plausible to many participants. How- 
ever, several questioned using q as a way of identifying that decline. One 
issue was whether events that affected productivity through capital ser- 
vices  would  be  properly measured by q.  Another  was  whether q  was 
influenced by developments unrelated to productivity. Jeffrey Sachs ob- 
served that, allowing for either putty-clay capital or costs of  adjusting 
the capital stock-both  of which he regarded as more realistic assump- 
tions  than  the  putty-putty  technology  without  adjustment costs  that 
Baily's formal model assumed-q  could move without signaling a change 
in capital services. Lawrence Summers added that, to the extent reduced 
q was supposed to have come from oil prices, the reduction in market 
values that lowered q must have anticipated the effects of those prices on 
profitability. But productivity should not be affected by such anticipatory 
effects and therefore would not be tracked by q. Alternatively, if markets 
did not anticipate, so that q reflected current profitability, oil prices could 
not  account for  the  observed  change in  q  during the  1970s.  William 
Nordhaus agreed that a vintage model with putty-clay technology  was 
needed to reflect the effects of oil prices on obsolescence.  He  reported 
that empirical attempts to  do  this  had  found  only  modest  effects  on 
productivity. 
The discussion turned to the decline in q that had occurred. Franco 
Modigliani believed  the actual decline in the ratio of  market value to 
earnings after 1973 indicated the market's erroneous use of the nominal 
interest rate to discount future real income streams. He  also noted that 
the ratio of profits to production costs should have declined according to 
Baily's hypothesis that capital services had  declined, while  in fact the 
ratio had changed little. Baily replied that measured profits would not 
reflect true profits, which should include the decline in the value of the 
capital stock and its ability to produce output in the future. But Nord- 
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applied to future earnings, it would have no connection with capital ser- 
vices and the productivity slowdown. He recalled that William Brainard, 
John Shoven, and Laurence Weiss  (BPEA,  2:1980)  had found that the 
decline in q could not be explained by changes in present and future cash 
flows and therefore had to come from changes in discount rates. Baily 
agreed that part of the decline in q in the 1970s may have been a result of 
an increase in the discount rate. But he argued that the persistence and 
severity of  the decline in q, accompanied by enough investment to in- 
crease the usual capital stock measures (particularly in manufacturing), 
also indicates that obsolescence caused part of the decline. 
Several participants discussed  Baily's  views  about  obsolescence  of 
the capital stock  and how  it  might affect investment and productivity 
with putty-clay technology. Charles Schultze noted that structural change 
need not  reduce capital services and productivity in the  aggregate. In 
theory, shifts in relative prices because of demand changes would lead to 
an increase in some quasi-rents and a decrease in others, with no pre- 
sumption as to the overall sign. Baily replied that the symmetry between 
gainers and losers cannot exist if there is not sufficient product-specific 
capital of the sort for which demand increased, so that there is a net loss 
of effective capital services. Christopher Sims observed that in the stan- 
dard putty-clay model, when the energy price increased there would be 
an incentive to immediately replace equipment that was not energy effi- 
cient. But if the capital goods themselves had to be redesigned, invest- 
ment would be delayed until more energy-efficient equipment was avail- 
able. He also observed that, since real energy prices had been declining 
before the oil shock, more recent vintages might be less energy-efficient 
than earlier ones. Scrapping or underutilization to save on energy might 
therefore involve capital that is relatively high in labor productivity and 
technology. Capital use in the utility industry could be an example of this 
phenomenon. Nordhaus said the observed increase in relative price dis- 
persion, which Baily cited as a reflection of structural change, may in- 
stead simply indicate the informational inefficiencies of inflation. He also 
noted that, since new regulations often exempted existing capital from 
compliance,  they might lead to  the postponement of  scrapping, which 
would weaken Baily's argument that regulations had increased obsoles- 
cence. 
There were some suggestions for further research. Charles Holt  sug- 
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the average age of capital stock could explain differences in the response 
of productivity to energy prices. Schultze reported that there had been a 
substantial decline in the ratio of government to private capital stock. He 
suggested that this decline in public investment, if in forms such as high- 
ways that aid private production, might have contributed to the produc- 
tivity decline. Robert Hall mentioned that much of the investment in the 
form of retrofitting  and other attempts at economizing on energy are actu- 
ally measured as current expenditures and not investment, thus under- 
stating both GNP and the size of the capital stock. He advocated closer 
examination of  particular industry behavior  along the lines  of  Robert 
Gordon's comments. 